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PREGNANT WOMEN’S RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT AFTER GONZALES V. CARHART 
Margo Kaplan* 
As several scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s Gonzales v. Carhart decision upholding the 
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA) represents a major departure from its 
previous abortion jurisprudence.  What has received little attention is the ease with which 
Carhart’s rationale can be imported into cases involving the medical treatment of women who wish 
to continue their pregnancies to term.  This article analyzes the implications of Carhart in a 
context that has thus far been overlooked and, in doing so, argues that its reasoning is broader 
and more troubling than the majority acknowledged or perhaps even intended. 
While common and constitutional law protect the right to refuse medical treatment, courts have 
compelled the medical treatment of pregnant women on rare occasions, citing the states’ interest in 
protecting fetal life as recognized in abortion jurisprudence.  Until Carhart, abortion 
jurisprudence provided very limited support for compelled medical treatment of pregnant women 
more generally.  Carhart interprets the state interests in fetal life and maternal health so broadly 
that it essentially creates new, dubious state interests that, in the context of compelled treatment 
cases, expand state justifications for requiring medical treatment of pregnant women, even where 
such treatment would harm women’s health.  The expansion of state power to compel medical 
treatment has disturbing implications for women’s liberty and equality.  Carhart paves the way to 
designating women as a “special class of persons” who have more limited rights to bodily autonomy 
and informed consent. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the majority’s protestations to the contrary, the Supreme 
Court’s Gonzales v. Carhart1 decision represents a significant departure 
from its previous abortion jurisprudence.  In Carhart, the Supreme 
Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
(PBABA), which outlawed a procedure used during abortions.2  As 
the dissent notes, the majority’s argument uses new, dubious inter-
pretations of state interests to justify abortion regulation.3  The Court 
also upheld PBABA despite significant medical evidence that the 
banned procedure is necessary to preserve women’s health in many 
circumstances, undermining the principle under Roe v. Wade and its 
progeny that women’s health must always be paramount in abortion 
regulation.4 
Although numerous scholars have noted Carhart’s troubling im-
plications for expanding states’ ability to regulate abortion,5 there has 
 
 1 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 2 Id. at 132, 168. 
 3 See id. at 181–87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Court offers flimsy and 
transparent justifications for upholding a nationwide ban on intact [intact dilation and 
evacuation procedure] sans any exception to safeguard a women’s health”). 
 4 See id. at 161–68 (discussing medical evidence pertaining to the necessity of the banned 
procedure and concluding that the Act should be upheld despite this evidence). 
 5 See, e.g., Leading Cases, Abortion Rights—“Partial Birth” Abortion, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 265 
(2007) [hereinafter Leading Cases, Abortion Rights] (arguing that Carhart’s deference to 
Congress in the face of medical disagreement was “inadequately theorized and swept too 
broadly”); Michael C. Dorf, Abortion Rights, 23 TOURO. L. REV. 815, 822–24 (2008) (criti-
cizing Carhart’s reasoning as expanding accepted state justifications for restricting abor-
tion); Matthew Gordon, State Attempts to Expand Abortion Informed Consent Requirements:  
New Life After Gonzales v. Carhart?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 751, 751, 753 (2007) (arguing 
that Carhart may provide new support to other restrictions on abortion access); Reva B. 
Siegel, The Right’s Reasons:  Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabor-
tion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1650 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Right’s Reasons] (ar-
guing that Carhart’s woman-protective rationale for restricting abortion advances an anti-
abortion argument that is gender-paternalistic and unresponsive to the real needs of 
women); Hannah Stahle, Fetal Pain Legislation:  An Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH 
L.J. 251, 274–75 (2007) (arguing that Carhart elevated the status of the fetus and dimi-
nished the status of a woman by banning an abortion procedure without creating an ex-
ception for medical necessity); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Wom-
en’s Regret” Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2008) (arguing that Carhart’s 
reasoning can be expanded to restrict other abortion procedures). 
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been little discussion of the ease with which Carhart’s rationale can be 
imported into cases involving the medical treatment of women who 
wish to continue their pregnancies to term.  This article argues that,  
while Carhart is objectionable solely based on the abortion issue it 
squarely addresses, further analysis reveals that its reasoning has 
troubling implications for women’s right to control other medical 
decisions during pregnancy.  Lower courts have considered attempts 
to compel treatment of pregnant women who intend to carry their 
pregnancies to term, but who have rejected medical intervention that 
would, in their physicians’ opinion, be optimal or even necessary to 
preserve the life or health of the fetus.  Courts have looked to abor-
tion jurisprudence to determine the parameters of the state’s interest 
in fetal life and whether that interest can justify intervention in preg-
nant women’s medical decisions that place the fetus they carry at risk.  
Until Carhart, abortion jurisprudence provided very limited support 
for such intervention. 
This article analyzes implications of Carhart that have thus far 
been overlooked and argues that its reasoning is broader and more 
troubling than the majority acknowledged or perhaps even intended.  
While on its face Carhart is limited to abortion procedures, it relies 
heavily on reasoning that is easily expanded to the compelled treat-
ment of pregnant women.  Carhart reinterprets the state interests in 
fetal life and maternal health and recognizes new interests that justify 
abortion regulation:  expressing respect for fetal life and preventing a 
woman from exercising informed consent where her decision would 
harm the fetus and might subsequently cause her to feel remorse.  
The decision also undermines the principle that these state interests 
may not be pursued at the expense of maternal health.  In the con-
text of compelled treatment cases, this reasoning allows the state to 
compel medical treatment of pregnant women in order to further the 
dubious interpretations of state interests in showing respect for the 
fetus and protecting the woman from making medical decisions the 
state believes she might regret and may even justify compelling such 
treatment where it would harm the woman’s health. 
Part II of this article outlines the Carhart decision and argues that 
Carhart’s reasoning expands the state interests that may be used to 
regulate abortion.  Carhart also eroded the primacy of women’s 
health, implying that these interests may be pursued at the expense 
of women’s health in certain circumstances.  Part III examines the ju-
risprudence of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women.  
While common law and constitutional jurisprudence recognize the 
right to refuse medical treatment, courts have often viewed pregnan-
cy as a unique circumstance subject to additional state interference.  
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In doing so, they looked to abortion jurisprudence to allow limited 
state intervention in pregnant women’s medical treatment choices to 
further the state’s interest in fetal life.  Part III argues that, until Car-
hart, abortion jurisprudence provided only very limited support for 
compelled medical treatment of pregnant women. 
Part IV argues that a reasonable interpretation of Carhart’s reason-
ing expands state power to compel medical treatment of pregnant 
women who intend to carry their pregnancies to term.  While Carhart 
and its predecessor, Stenberg v. Carhart,6 concerned abortion rights, 
the crux of the issue in both cases was balancing a patient’s right to 
choose her course of medical treatment against the state’s interest in 
fetal life.  Carhart recognizes new state interests and allows the state to 
pursue them at the expense of women’s health where there is a mod-
icum of uncertainty about the effect on women’s health.  It provides 
new arguments for those seeking to compel the medical treatment of 
pregnant women for the benefit of the fetus, even where such treat-
ment might be detrimental to the health of the woman.  Part IV also 
demonstrates how this reasoning could be applied to specific medical 
decisions that arise during pregnancy and childbirth. 
Part V argues that the expansion of state intervention into the 
medical treatment decisions of pregnant women has several disturb-
ing consequences.  Doctrinally, it infringes on women’s liberty and 
equality rights, designating pregnant women as a “special class of per-
sons”7 who, solely because of their pregnancy, have more limited 
rights to bodily autonomy and informed consent.  It perpetuates the 
view that pregnant women are less autonomous than other individu-
als and that the state may commandeer their bodies because of their 
reproductive capabilities.  Because Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
separated and weakened liberty-based and equality-based arguments 
that challenge limitations on women’s reproductive rights, it often 
fails to recognize the full implications of compelled medical treat-
ment.  Part V presents an approach that views these two interests as 
intertwined, which more accurately addresses the ramifications of 
compelled medical treatment and provides fuller protection for 
pregnant women’s rights to refuse medical treatment.  Part V also ar-
gues that compelled medical treatment has troubling public health 
implications, damaging the physician-patient relationship, placing 
physicians in the ethically questionable position of seeking court in-
 
 6 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 7 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1256 (D.C. 1990) (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
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tervention in more situations, and compromising prenatal medical 
care. 
II.  THE GONZALES V. CARHART DECISION 
A. Background 
The Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional right to an 
abortion in Roe v. Wade.8  In Roe, the Court held that the right to an 
abortion is part of the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.9  It acknowledged the health issues of women needing 
abortions and held that, while the state has an interest in fetal life 
that becomes compelling at viability, this interest may not be pursued 
at the expense of the health or life of the mother.10  The state may 
prohibit abortion after viability, but it must allow an exception for the 
life or health of the mother.  The Court’s 1992 decision in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey held that the state may 
regulate abortion prior to viability to further its interest in protecting 
women’s health, as long as the regulations do not create an “undue 
burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.11  It reaffirmed 
Roe’s holding that the state’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling 
at viability and that the state may regulate and even proscribe abor-
tion after viability as long as it maintains an exception for the life or 
health of the mother.  Casey therefore sustained the primacy of the 
mother’s life and health over the state’s interest in protecting fetal 
life.12 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska statute 
outlawing what it termed “partial birth abortions.”13  The Court cited 
 
 8 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 9 See id. at 152–54. 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s con-
cept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the 
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy. 
  Id. at 153. 
 10 See id. at 163–64 (“If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go 
so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the mother.”). 
 11 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“A statute with [a 
purpose of creating an undue burden on a woman’s access to an abortion] is invalid be-
cause the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calcu-
lated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”). 
 12 See id. at 846 (restating and reaffirming the holding of Roe v. Wade). 
 13 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000) (“We must consequently find the 
statute unconstitutional.”); see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 265 
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two grounds for its holding:  (1) that the Nebraska law contained no 
health exception, and (2) that the law was unconstitutionally vague, 
making it impossible for physicians to determine whether several 
abortion procedures were permissible under the statute.14  Stenberg v. 
Carhart reiterated the health exception requirement set forth in Roe 
and Casey.15  It rejected the argument that a health exception is not 
required where there are safe alternatives available because Nebraska 
failed to demonstrate that the ban would not create significant risks 
for women.16  It cited the “significant medical authority” supporting 
the proposition that “in some circumstances, [the banned proce-
dure] would be the safest procedure.”17  Stenberg v. Carhart affirmed 
that the mother’s health may not be compromised by abortion regu-
lation, and that this requirement not only prohibits courts from ban-
ning post-viability abortion altogether, but also from banning a par-
ticular pre-viability or post-viability abortion procedure that is a safer 
alternative than another procedure that remains available. 
The Court also rejected arguments that the health exception is 
not required because of uncertainty as to whether the procedure 
would be necessary or affect most women’s health.  The Court dis-
 
(noting that “the Supreme Court struck down on facial challenge Nebraska’s ‘partial-
birth’ abortion ban for failing to provide an exception allowing the procedure when ne-
cessary to protect the health of the mother”); Dorf, supra note 5, at 817–18 (discussing 
how the Court found Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban to be unconstitutional be-
cause it violated “the principles of Casey”); Turner, supra note 5, at 12 (providing informa-
tion about the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Nebraska’s “‘partial-birth abor-
tion’ law”); Laura J. Tepich, Note, Gonzales v. Carhart:  The Partial Termination of the Right 
to Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 365–71 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s ratio-
nale for its decision in Stenberg v. Carhart).  The term “partial birth abortion” was coined 
by a member of Congress while developing legislation banning certain abortion proce-
dures.  It is a political, rather than medical, term and is not recognized in the medical 
field.  See Alex Gordon, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
501, 502 n.15 (2004) [hereinafter Gordon, PBABA]. 
 14 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930, 937–38, 942–43 (elaborating on the two grounds for the Su-
preme Court’s holding); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 817–18 (discussing the two grounds 
for the Supreme Court’s holding); Tepich, supra note 13, at 367–68 (“The Court, after 
summarizing the medical procedures involved in the Nebraska statute, proceeded quickly 
to conclude that the statute violated the Constitution for at least two independent rea-
sons.”). 
 15 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (noting that the law lacked an exception to preserve the 
mother’s health). 
 16 See id. at 932 (“The State fails to demonstrate that banning [the dilation and evacuation 
procedure] without a health exception may not create significant health risks for wom-
en . . . .”); see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing the Court’s conclusion that a 
substantial number of medical experts believed that the procedure would be safer for 
some patients). 
 17 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932; see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Stenberg v. Carhart). 
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missed the argument that the health exception was not necessary be-
cause the procedure was rarely employed, arguing, “the State cannot 
prohibit a person from obtaining treatment simply by pointing out 
that most people do not need it.”18  The determination that a proce-
dure is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother does not require “an absolute necessity,” “absolute proof,” or 
“unanimity of medical opinion.”19 
In reaction to the decision, Congress passed the federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA).20  PBABA is materially 
identical to the Nebraska statute in all respects except that it contains 
a different definition of what constitutes a “partial-birth abortion,” a 
term used to describe a variation of a procedure the medical com-
munity refers to as a “dilation and evacuation,” or a “D&E.”21  The sta-
tute provides anatomical landmarks intended to give greater notice 
to physicians as to whether a procedure is outlawed than the Ne-
braska statute.22  It contains a life exception but no health exception, 
citing congressional findings that a “moral, medical, and ethical con-
sensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abor-
tion . . . is never medically necessary.”23  PBABA was successfully chal-
lenged in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which both held that 
 
 18 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934; see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (“[T]he Court concluded 
that the infrequency of the [dilation and evacuation] procedure did not justify Ne-
braska’s lack of a health exception and that the procedure’s relative rarity was ‘not highly 
relevant.’”). 
 19 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937; see also Tepich, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing how a “signifi-
cant body of medical opinion” believed that the dilation and evacuation procedure was 
safer for some patients and noting that the Carhart Court felt the procedure should not 
be banned in light of this belief). 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003); Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 266; 
Dorf, supra note 5, at 818–19. 
 21 See Press Release, ACOG Files Amicus Brief in Gonzales v. Carhart and Gonzales v. PPFA 
(Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_releases/nr09-
22-06.cfm; see also Gordon, PBABA, supra note 13, at 502 n.15.  The term “partial birth 
abortion” is not a medical term and was invented for the purposes of legislation.  See id. 
 22 See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2003).  The act defines a “partial-birth abortion” 
to be an abortion in which the individual performing the abortion  
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a 
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, 
in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is out-
side the body of the mother . . . . 
See also Dorf, supra note 5, at 818–19 (describing how the federal act provided a clear-
er definition of a partial-birth abortion than the Nebraska law). 
 23 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003); see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 
266 (noting that Congress adopted factual findings in conflict with those relied upon by 
the Stenberg v. Carhart court in enacting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). 
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PBABA unconstitutionally failed to provide a health exception.24  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed both decisions in 
Gonzales v. Carhart.25 
B. The Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, cited numer-
ous state interests supporting PBABA.  Primary among these was an 
interest in expressing respect for human life.26  The Court, citing the 
state interest in protecting fetal life, stated, “[t]he government may 
use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect 
for the life within the woman.”27  The Court argued that the state 
could further this interest by banning a procedure that would “coar-
sen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable 
and innocent human life . . . .”28 
The Court also cited a related state interest in protecting the inte-
grity and ethics of the medical profession by protecting the respect 
for fetal life within the medical profession.29  The Court argued that 
the state’s “legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession 
in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn,” 
was served by PBABA because the banned procedure “implicates ad-
ditional ethical and moral concerns” above and beyond other abor-
tion procedures.30  It argued that PBABA also furthered this interest 
 
 24 See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 792–96 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding the PBABA un-
constitutional due to its lack of health exception); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the PBABA un-
constitutional on the grounds that it “lacks the constitutionally required health excep-
tion”).  The Ninth Circuit also held that PBABA was unconstitutionally vague and un-
constitutionally restricted the dilation and extraction abortion procedure.  See Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n, 435 F.3d at 1171. 
 25 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 26 See id. at 157 (“The Act expresses respect for the dignity of human life.”); see also Turner, 
supra note 5, at 15 (citing passages from Gonzales v. Carhart which highlight state interests 
supporting PBABA). 
 27 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157; see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 
268 (discussing governmental interests underlying the ban deemed legitimate by the 
Court); Tepich supra note 13, at 381 (quoting the highlighted passage); Turner, supra 
note 5, at 15 (quoting the highlighted passage). 
 28 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157; see also Stahle, supra note 5, at 274–75 (quoting the 
highlighted passage). 
 29 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (“There can be no doubt that the government 
‘has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.’”); see also 
Tepich, supra note 13, at 381 (quoting passages from Gonzales v. Carhart suggesting that 
the public’s perception of a doctor’s appropriate role during the delivery process could 
be upset by knowledge that doctors assist in partial-birth abortions). 
 30 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158; see also Turner, supra note 5, at 15 (quoting the hig-
hlighted passage). 
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because Congress might reasonably conclude that “partial birth abor-
tion, more than standard D&E, ‘undermines the public’s perception 
of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process, 
and perverts a process during which life is brought into the world.’”31 
The Court also described a state interest in protecting a woman 
from the regret it presumed she would feel if she chose to undergo 
the banned procedure.  In the majority’s words: 
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of 
love the mother has for her child.  The Act recognizes this reality as well.  
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral deci-
sion.  While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it 
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their 
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.  Severe 
depression and loss of esteem can follow.32 
In support of this theory, the Court cited an amicus brief support-
ing PBABA that argued that “abortion hurts women physically, emo-
tionally, and psychologically,” and that women who have abortions 
often suffer from “Post-abortion Syndrome.”33 
The Court also tied this concern to the need to protect informed 
consent among patients: 
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors 
may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used, 
confining themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure 
entails. . . . It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning 
the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to 
the State.  The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well 
informed.  It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice 
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished . . . when she learns, 
only after the event, what she once did not know:  that she allowed a doc-
tor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her un-
born child, a child assuming the human form.34 
After finding that PBABA furthers these purported state interests, 
the Court turned to the question of whether PBABA is unconstitu-
 
 31 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 160 (quoting Congressional Findings ¶(14)(K)).  But see 
Tepich, supra note 13, at 381 (suggesting the public’s perception of physicians might ac-
tually be improved by allowing doctors to use safe abortion methods). 
 32 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal citations omitted); see also Turner, note 5, at 
16–18 (discussing the meager evidence available to support the “regret rationale”). 
 33 Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, 19, Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 
(citing the Sandra Cano et al. amicus brief); Turner, supra note 5, at 16–17 (highlighting 
sections of the Sandra Cano et al. amicus brief which suggest that abortion harms wom-
en). 
 34 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159–60 (internal citation omitted); see also Turner, supra 
note 5, at 17–18 (discussing the women’s regret rationale used to support the Court’s de-
cision in Gonzales v. Carhart). 
Nov. 2010] SPECIAL CLASS OF PERSONS 155 
 
tional because it lacks a health exception.  The Court determined 
that PBABA need not contain a health exception because of “docu-
mented medical disagreement” over whether the procedure is medi-
cally necessary.35  While the Court would not give complete deference 
to legislative findings—and, indeed, noted inaccuracies in Congress’s 
findings—it implied that it would defer to legislative findings where 
“medical uncertainty” exists.36 
The Court justified its holding by distinguishing facial attacks 
from as-applied challenges and by arguing that medical uncertainty 
about the need for a health exception precluded a holding that 
PBABA was invalid on its face.37  The respondents had not met the 
“heavy burden” of a facial attack because they had not demonstrated 
that PBABA “would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant 
cases.”38  It further argued that the statute at issue was applicable 
whenever “the doctor proposes to use the prohibited procedure, not 
merely those in which the woman suffers from medical complica-
tions.  It is neither our obligation nor within our traditional institu-
tional role to resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to 
each potential situation that might develop.”39  The Court concluded 
that a facial attack could not succeed because the respondents could 
not show that the banned procedure is medically necessary in a large 
fraction of the cases in which the procedure is used.40 
The Court left open the question of whether an as-applied chal-
lenge could succeed.  It argued that an as-applied challenge, rather 
than a facial challenge, was the proper means to challenge PBABA “if 
it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particu-
lar condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohi-
bited by the Act must be used” because “[i]n an as-applied challenge 
 
 35 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 162–66; see Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 
268 (indicating that despite the “documented medical disagreement” regarding whether 
the procedure was ever medically necessary, the Court upheld the PBABA). 
 36 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164–65; see Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 
268 (discussing this section of the Gonzales v. Carhart opinion); Dorf, supra note 5, at 821 
(noting that the Court chose to uphold PBABA despite noting that Congress is “not en-
titled to any special deference”). 
 37 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there 
is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s 
health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe 
alternatives.”). 
 38 Id. at 167–68. 
 39 Id. at 168. 
 40 Id. at 167–68. 
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the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced 
than in a facial attack.”41 
C. The Dissent 
The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, criticized the majority opinion for sacri-
ficing women’s health to further dubious state interests.  Echoing the 
majority opinion in Stenberg, the dissent noted that PBABA did not 
further any of the state interests that Roe identified as justifying the 
regulation of abortion in limited circumstances.  It argued that 
PBABA does not further the state interest in fetal life because no fetal 
lives were saved; the ban only limits how a fetus will be aborted rather 
than whether a fetus will be aborted.42 
The dissent also rejected the “mother’s regret” rationale as a pa-
ternalistic intrusion into the rights of women to make their own med-
ical decisions.43  The dissent noted that there was no evidence sup-
porting the majority’s conclusion that women “regret their choices, 
and consequently suffer from ‘[s]evere depression and loss of self-
esteem.’”44  The dissent also argued that, if women’s informed con-
sent were a legitimate concern, the proper state response would be to 
require physicians to inform women of the different procedures and 
their risks, rather than “deprive[] women of the right to make an au-
tonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”45  Ginsburg’s 
dissent decried the paternalism inherent in the majority decision, 
cautioning that the majority’s “way of thinking reflects ancient no-
tions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitu-
tion—ideas that have long since been discredited.”46 
 
 41 Id. at 167. 
 42 See id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, 
for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”); see also Leading Cases, Abortion 
Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (“Justice Ginsburg argued that the Act furthered no legitimate 
governmental interests, and in fact did not even further the government’s asserted inter-
est in protecting potential life, due to the availability of alternative late-term abortion 
procedures.”). 
 43 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Court’s paternalistic views of “women’s place in the family and under the Constitution” 
were long ago “discredited”); see also Turner, supra note 5, at 18–19 (discussing Justice 
Ginsburg’s alarm over the majority’s view of the proper role of women). 
 44 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority); see 
also Turner, supra note 5, at 18–19 (quoting the highlighted passage). 
 45 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Turner, supra 
note 5, at 19 (quoting the highlighted passage). 
 46 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Turner, supra note 
5, at 19 (quoting the highlighted passage).  Justice Ginsburg cites, as examples, Bradwell v. 
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The dissent noted that the majority opinion compromised the 
health exception requirement set forth in Roe, Casey, and Stenberg and 
for the first time accepted a ban on an abortion procedure without a 
health exception.47  It argued that the majority’s conclusion that a fa-
cial challenge required a showing that the ban was unconstitutional 
in “a large fraction of relevant cases” was inconsistent with both 
precedent and logic.  The Court has considered and upheld numer-
ous facial attacks on abortion statutes since Roe, including a nearly 
identical attack in Stenberg.48  The majority’s holding that a successful 
facial challenge to the ban would need to show medical necessity in a 
large fraction of relevant cases made little sense given that “[t]he very 
purpose of a health exception is to protect women in the exceptional 
cases.”49 
The dissent also argued that there is, in fact, no real medical un-
certainty.  Congress’s findings were based on a small number of ideo-
logically-driven health care providers and contained numerous er-
rors, in contrast with the substantial medical authority stating that the 
banned procedure is, in certain circumstances, far safer than the al-
ternatives.50  The dissent concluded that the majority opinion con-
flicted with Supreme Court precedent holding that the state may not 
 
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908), 
discussed infra Section V.A.3. 
 47 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court 
blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.”); see also Dorf, 
supra note 5, at 821–22 (discussing how the Court decided to uphold the PBABA despite 
the lack of exception to safeguard the health of the mother). 
 48 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 187–88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This holding is 
perplexing given that, in materially identical circumstances we held that a statute lacking 
a health exception was unconstitutional on its face.”); see also Leading Cases, Abortion 
Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (“[T]he dissent lamented the Court’s rejection of a facial at-
tack, since such challenges had been approved in similar circumstances . . . .). 
 49 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued: 
Casey makes clear that, in determining whether any restriction poses an undue 
burden on a “large fraction” of women, the relevant class is not “all women,” nor 
“all pregnant women,” nor even all women “seeking abortions.”  Rather, a provi-
sion restricting access to abortion, “must be judged by reference to those [women] 
for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.”  Thus the absence of 
a health exception burdens all women for whom it is relevant—women who, in the 
judgment of their doctors, require an intact D&E because other procedures would 
place their health at risk. 
  Id. at 188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 50 See id. at 174–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he congressional findings on 
which the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act rests do not withstand inspection, as the lower 
courts have determined and this Court is obliged to concede”); see also Dorf, supra note 5, 
at 822 (“Congress could only find a small number of ideologically-driven doctors to say 
that the procedure is never necessary.  And even those doctors did not quite say that.”). 
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subject women to health risks by forcing women to resort to less safe 
methods of abortion.51 
D. Reconciling the Two Interpretations:  What Does Carhart Really Say? 
While Carhart does not overrule Stenberg and states that Casey is 
controlling, it is a significant departure from past abortion jurispru-
dence on several grounds.  First, it expands the “fetal life” state inter-
est far beyond what Roe and its progeny intended, essentially recog-
nizing new state interests in promoting respect for human life and 
protecting women from medical decisions they might regret.  It holds 
that no health exception is necessary if there is uncertainty regarding 
health risks in the majority of cases.  More disturbing, it allows for 
such uncertainty to be generated through the use of flimsy evidence.  
Together, the recognition of new state interests and devaluing of 
women’s autonomy and health imply that the state may pursue these 
new state interests even where they significantly compromise the 
health of women. 
While the majority opinion cites Casey to argue that it is furthering 
the state interest in protecting fetal life, what it actually furthers is far 
more abstract.  As the dissent notes, PBABA does not further the 
state’s interest in protecting fetal life because it saves no fetal lives.52  
The majority broadly interprets the state’s interest in fetal life to in-
clude a symbolic purpose of “express[ing] respect for the dignity of 
human life.”53  Thus, the majority interprets the state’s interest in pro-
tecting fetal life to include the state’s simple, even if ineffectual, ex-
pression of moral opposition to abortion even where no fetal lives are 
saved as a direct result.54 
 
 51 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 172–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Court 
has consistently required that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in 
all cases, safeguard a woman’s health”). 
 52 Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 269 
(describing Ginsburg’s argument as to why PBABA does not further the state interest of 
protecting life); see also Gordon, supra note 5, at 753 (describing how the Gonzales v. Car-
hart majority “accepted as sufficient the rationale that [PBABA] furthered the state’s in-
terest in ‘preserving and promoting fetal life’ even when, as the dissent noted, the law 
seems unlikely to actually save any fetuses because it merely outlaws a single method of 
abortion”); Tepich, supra note 13, at 381 (highlighting that the statue does not prevent 
abortions and thus “does not further a state’s interest in the potentiality of human life”). 
 53 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157; see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 824 (“[I]n banning a 
procedure that looks uncomfortably like infanticide, Congress aimed to preserve the line 
between infanticide and abortion.”). 
 54 See Dorf, supra note 5, at 823–24 (“[T]he [Gonzales v. Carhart] Court expanded the state’s 
expressive interest in describing its moral opposition to abortion . . . .”).  While Casey did 
uphold the state’s ability to promote respect for fetal life, it did not recognize this as a dis-
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Carhart implies that the state’s interest in fetal life justifies state ac-
tion that is directed at sending a message to society in general about 
the morality of a particular method of abortion.  Concerned about 
the procedure’s effect of “coarsen[ing] society to the humanity of not 
only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life,” the 
Court allows the state to ban an abortion procedure in order to 
“promote respect for life, including the life of the unborn.”55  The in-
tended impact is not on fetal lives, but rather society as a whole.56 
The decision also recognizes a new state interest in protecting the 
maternal-fetal relationship and protecting women from the regret the 
Court assumes they will feel should they harm that relationship.  The 
Court frames this interest in terms of protecting women’s health.  Ca-
sey recognized that a state interest in protecting women’s health may 
justify an abortion regulation as long as the regulation does not 
create an undue burden on women’s right to an abortion.  Carhart 
reasons that PBABA furthers this interest because:  (1) there is a spe-
cial relationship between women and the children they carry; (2) be-
cause of this special relationship, a woman may regret her decision to 
have an abortion, particularly an abortion that used the banned pro-
cedure; and (3) women may suffer psychological harm due to their 
regret.  By banning the procedure, the Court argues, the state is pro-
tecting women from making a decision that may harm their psycho-
logical health. 
While the majority argued that it was somehow protecting in-
formed consent, the majority decision actually eliminated women’s 
ability to make an informed medical decision rather than providing 
 
tinct state interest justifying abortion restrictions.  Rather, Casey allowed the state to ad-
vance its interest in protecting fetal life through “informed consent” requirements meant 
to impress upon a pregnant woman the state’s respect for fetal life, and thereby persuade 
her not to have an abortion.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
878 (1992) (upholding the state’s informed consent requirements).  Casey states that: 
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy 
the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and 
measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their 
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. 
  Id. (emphasis added).  Expression of respect for life was therefore permitted only as a 
means to protect fetal life—the state action must be intended to persuade women consi-
dering abortion to forego abortion.  In contrast, PBABA saves no fetal lives—the expres-
sion of respect for fetal life to society in general is the end in itself. 
 55 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157–58. 
 56 See Dorf, supra note 5, at 824 (“The audience for partial-birth abortion bans, the audience 
for the expression of Congress’s condemnation of this form of abortion, is not just indi-
vidual women . . . but the population as a whole.”); see also John Lawrence Hill, The Consti-
tutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 51–52 (2009–2010) (using Carhart as an 
example of the Court’s approval of a regulation used to promote moral values, indepen-
dent of any justification based on harm to life). 
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them with additional information to make a more informed choice.57  
It rests its decision on a baseless assumption, lacking credible evi-
dence, about the psychological harm abortion must cause women.58  
Citing the “bond of love” the Court assumes the mother feels for her 
unborn child and the profound regret women must feel after abor-
tion, the Court implies that pregnant women do not have the same 
ability to make informed medical choices as the rest of the popula-
tion, and that the state is therefore justified in making these decisions 
for them.59  The majority delineates pregnant women as a unique 
class of persons who cannot make informed decisions, at least with 
regard to decisions that may harm the unique bond they share with 
the fetus they carry. 
As the dissent argues, this reasoning is acutely paternalistic, re-
flecting traditional notions about a woman’s place in society as a 
mother rather than more recent jurisprudence allowing women to 
choose their own place in society.  The dissent compares the majori-
ty’s reasoning to cases discussed infra, Section 0, in which the Court 
accepted state mandates that limited women’s ability to pursue em-
ployment because such employment might interfere with their roles 
as mothers and their ability to bear healthy children for the benefit of 
society.60  Kennedy’s insistence that the bond of love between a moth-
er and child can be used to limit women’s access to abortion proce-
dures is in direct conflict with Casey, which explicitly rejects the state 
using a woman’s reproductive capability to “insist . . . upon its own vi-
 
 57 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court de-
prives women of the right to make an autonomous choice . . . .”); see also Dorf, supra note 
5, at 823 (arguing that, because the state chooses to ban the procedure rather than pro-
mote more information about it, the state interest cannot be an interest in informed 
choice). 
 58 See Turner, supra note 5, at 22–28, 40–42 (discussing the importance of the development 
of, and Court endorsement of, the “women’s regret” rationale); Tepich, supra note 13, at 
384 (stating that the Court “chooses to criminalize an abortion procedure to protect 
women from themselves”). 
 59 The reasoning that women do not really understand what they are doing when they have 
abortions is common rhetoric of the anti-choice movement.  See Reva B. Siegel, The New 
Politics of Abortion:  An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 991, 1008–10 [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] (discussing women-protective justi-
fications for an abortion ban in South Dakota). 
 60 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908) and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)); see also Turn-
er, supra note 5, at 19–21 (citing pertinent passages from Muller v. Oregon); infra Section 
V.A.3.   
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sion of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in 
the course of our history and our culture.”61 
The decision also undermines the health exception requirement 
set forth in Roe and its progeny.  Cases such as Roe, Casey, and Stenberg 
treat the health exception as a distinct requirement.62  Carhart treats 
the health exception as part of the undue burden analysis, conclud-
ing that the lack of health exception is acceptable because it does not 
pose an undue burden.63  Analyzing the health exception under the 
undue burden analysis makes little sense, given that the health excep-
tion is required even after viability, when states may prohibit abortion 
altogether. 
Perhaps more important, Carhart does not require a health excep-
tion where there is uncertainty about whether the banned procedure 
may be medically necessary.  The Court reasons that, in areas of med-
ical uncertainty, it will accept legislative judgment about what is med-
ically necessary.64  This stands in stark contrast to past cases, including 
Stenberg, in which the Court held that medical uncertainty requires 
that courts find a ban unconstitutional.65  It also conflicts with prior 
decisions, including Roe, stating that the decision whether to have an 
abortion for medical reasons must be left to patients as guided by the 
professional judgment of physicians.66 
 
 61 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Turner, su-
pra note 5, at 21 (emphasizing the way in which the Gonzales v. Carhart Court’s holding 
contradicts the holding of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey). 
 62 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929–31 (2000) (finding that Nebraska’s statute 
banning partial-birth abortions violates the Constitution, Roe, and Casey); see also B. Jessie 
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions:  A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2007) (discussing the Stenberg Court’s rationale for finding the 
Nebraska statute banning partial-birth abortions to be unconstitutional). 
 63 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164 (providing passages suggesting that the Court 
merged the health exception into the undue burden analysis). 
 64 See id. at 163 (“The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this medical un-
certainty persists.  The Court’s precedents instruct that the Act can survive this facial at-
tack.”); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 822 (arguing that there was actually medical certainty 
of the necessity of partial-birth abortions because Congress had a difficult time finding an 
expert to testify that a partial-birth abortion is never medically necessary); Gordon, supra 
note 5, at 753 (discussing the dangerous precedent set by the Court in deferring to legis-
lative, rather than medical, judgment in Gonzales v. Carhart). 
 65 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 937–38 (holding that a Nebraska statute banning partial-
birth abortion was unconstitutional due to its lack of an exception to safeguard the health 
of the mother); see also Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 173–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court has consistently required that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of 
pregnancy and in all cases, safeguard a woman’s health.”); Dorf, supra note 5, at 822 (dis-
cussing how the Court’s deference to legislative judgment over medical judgment con-
flicts with the holding of Stenberg). 
 66 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (describing how, during the early stages of 
pregnancy, the decision whether to have an abortion should be made by the physician 
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The Carhart decision also showed a troubling willingness to accept 
flimsy medical evidence in order to support a finding of “medical un-
certainty.”  The dissent and the district court opinions cited substan-
tial evidence from numerous recognized physicians and medical au-
thorities detailing how an intact D&E may be medically necessary in 
various circumstances.67  In contrast, Congress’s findings were based 
on the testimony of physicians with no training in or experience with 
intact D&E and who performed abortions only on rare occasions.68  
The majority allowed small amounts of questionable evidence to ne-
gate the need for a health exception by deferring to Congress based 
on the “uncertainty” created by this testimony.69 
III.  COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN 
A. Introduction 
Despite common law and, more recently, constitutional law prin-
ciples recognizing and protecting the right to refuse medical treat-
ment, pregnancy is often viewed as a special case by courts.  Courts 
have intervened in the medical treatment of pregnant women in ways 
they have not dared with the non-pregnant.  Courts have allowed 
 
and his patient); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 822 (discussing how precedent suggests that 
“the decision whether to have a therapeutic abortion should be left to patients as guided 
by the professional medical judgment of their physicians”). 
 67 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 174–79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing evidence from 
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and Car-
hart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004)). 
 68 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how some of 
the more highly qualified experts who provided the Court with evidence about the D&E 
procedure suggested that it was the safest available procedure in certain circumstances). 
 69 The facial/as-applied distinction the majority uses to justify the lack of health exception 
falls apart on examination.  The facial attack has been the primary means of challenging 
abortion regulation statutes since Roe, including a nearly identical attack in Stenberg.  Id. at 
187–88; see also Leading Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (“[T]he dissent la-
mented the Court’s rejection of a facial attack, since such challenges had been approved 
in similar circumstances . . . .”).  Such facial attacks need not demonstrate that a health 
exception is needed in a large fraction of cases given that “[t]he very purpose of the 
health exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.”  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 
189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  It is also worth noting that the respondents challenged 
PBABA both on its face and as-applied to particular doctors.  See Dorf, supra note 5, at 825 
(discussing how Gonzales v. Carhart was brought as both a facial and an as-applied chal-
lenge).  If the Court was stating that an as-applied challenge must be brought by particu-
lar pregnant women, this is likely to impose significant obstacles on those seeking to chal-
lenge PBABA—a plaintiff facing a difficult and personal medical decision must be willing 
to lay bare her medical history and decision to have an abortion, knowing that the slow 
pace of litigation will make it all but impossible for her to obtain relief in time to secure 
the procedure that best serves her health.  See id. at 825. 
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state intervention in pregnant women’s medical treatment choices on 
the grounds that the state has an interest in fetal life, as outlined by 
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence.  Pre-Carhart abortion cases 
provided very limited support for state intervention in the treatment 
of pregnant women.  Intervention could only be contemplated when 
the fetus’s very life was at stake.  Even then, the uncertainty with 
which intervention was needed to save the life weakened the state’s 
interest.  Supreme Court jurisprudence also foreclosed the possibility 
of intervention when it would compromise the health of the mother.  
Thus, invasive medical procedures that would put the mother’s 
health or life at risk could not be compelled for the sake of further-
ing the state’s interest in fetal life. 
B. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
Under state common law, the right to refuse medical treatment is 
grounded in the concept of autonomy.  It is closely related to the 
right to informed consent, with some courts citing additional support 
in the common law or constitutional right to privacy and bodily inte-
grity.70  These rights share the common thread of respect for an indi-
vidual’s right to autonomy.71  Informed consent promotes patient au-
tonomy by requiring physicians to inform patients of their diagnosis, 
the alternative treatments and their consequences (including the 
consequence of no treatment), and their recommendations for 
treatment so that a patient is able to make a meaningful choice.72  
 
 70 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (outlining pertinent 
cases). 
 71 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion Restrictions Under Ca-
sey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1754–56 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity] (discussing 
how the right to refuse medical treatment and the right to informed consent both relate 
to principles of autonomous decision making). 
 72 See id. at 1754–55 (discussing the importance of informed consent); see also COUNCIL ON 
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION:  CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 227 (2006–
2007) (“The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice.”); Pamala Harris, Note, 
Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:  The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 134 (2001) (“The general rule of medical treatment is that doc-
tors may not act without a patient’s informed consent.  Informed consent promotes pa-
tient autonomy and safeguards the integrity of the physician.”) (footnotes omitted).  Tort 
law recognizes this by holding a health care provider who does not obtain informed con-
sent before treating a patient liable for battery because the provider has intruded on the 
bodily autonomy of the individual.  See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 
93 (N.Y. 1914) (“[A] surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”); Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices 
During Pregnancy:  Whose Decision Is It Anyway?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 591, 596 (1989) (“A 
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The logical corollary of informed consent is the right to exercise au-
tonomy by withholding consent and refusing treatment.73  Similarly, 
the right to privacy and bodily integrity protects the right to be let 
alone from government interference, particularly with regard to bo-
dily autonomy.74 
The common law right to refuse medical treatment is not abso-
lute.  Courts have recognized four countervailing state interests that 
may be used to override a patient’s right to refuse treatment:  (1) the 
prevention of suicide; (2) the preservation of life; (3) the protection 
of third parties; and (4) the preservation of the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession.75  The right to refuse treatment strengthens, 
and state interest weakens, as the degree of bodily invasion increases 
and likelihood that the treatment would effectively treat the patient 
decreases.76 
While all of these exceptions are limited and rarely employed, it is 
particularly important to note that the protection of third parties has 
only been applied in very limited circumstances.  In general, it is well 
accepted that the state cannot compel an individual to undergo med-
ical treatment for the benefit of another, even where doing so would 
save the life of a third party.77  The classic case cited for this proposi-
 
doctor must obtain consent before treating the patient or the unauthorized contact will 
be deemed a battery.”); see also SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY:  THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF OBSTETRIC CONFLICT 6–7 (2005) (discussing how the law protects an individu-
al’s decision to obtain or refuse medical treatment); Harris, supra, at 134 (describing how 
a doctor may be able to obtain a court order to compel treatment if a pregnant woman 
refuses).   
 73 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. 
 74 See Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396–97 (Mass. 1983) (finding that a pregnant woman, 
entitled to the constitutional right of privacy, is permitted to exercise this right by refus-
ing medical treatment). 
 75 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (stating the same four state interests); MEREDITH, supra note 
72, at 46–50 (detailing the four countervailing state interests); Goldberg, supra note 72, at 
597 (noting the same four countervailing state interests). 
 76 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (noting that a state’s interest weakens as 
the degree of bodily invasion grows), abrogated on other grounds by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 
1209 (N.J. 1989); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 19-4 (2d ed. 2000) (dis-
cussing a state’s remedies when a fetus is neglected or harmed by the pregnant woman); 
Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions:  What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 55–56 (1987) (noting the necessity of judicial inquiry in each case, and 
the, often, incomplete and conflicting evidence that judges find). 
 77 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, § 19–2 (“The law does not recognize any circumstance 
when a person must undergo a medical procedure for the benefit of another person.”); 
see also Cheryl E. Amana, Drugs, AIDS and Reproductive Choice:  Maternal-State Conflict Con-
tinues into the Millennium, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 32, 57 (2005) (“A woman should not be 
treated differently based on her pregnancy, but that does not mean that she will not 
be.”); Gallagher, supra note 76, at 23–24 (discussing Judge Flaherty’s order in McFall v. 
Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978), which rested upon the duty to rescue theory in refus-
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tion is McFall v. Shimp, in which a court declined to order a man to 
donate bone marrow that would save his cousin’s life.78  The court 
held that:   
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that 
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or take action 
to save another human being or to rescue. . . . For our law to compel de-
fendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every con-
cept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would 
defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which 
would know no limits . . . .79 
For this reason, the third party exception is somewhat controversial 
and has only been applied in rare circumstances.80 
In 1990, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional dimen-
sion to the common law right to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan 
 
ing to compel an individual to undergo treatment to benefit another); Michael A. Grizzi, 
Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 473, 
488–89 & n.70 (1995) (noting that courts are “wary” of having one individual undergo a 
medical treatment to benefit the other individual, who is the fetus); Howard Minkoff & 
Lynn M. Paltrow, The Rights of “Unborn Children” and the Value of Pregnant Women, 36 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 26, 27 (2006) [hereinafter Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn 
Children] (discussing how worrisome it is that laws have elevated the rights of the fetus to 
the rights of the pregnant woman); Terri-Ann Samuels et al., Obstetricians, Health Attorneys, 
and Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 17 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 107, 108 (2007) (noting 
that it is not within the framework of our law to compel one individual to undergo medi-
cal treatment to benefit another).   
 78 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (1978) (noting that a court has no authority to 
compel one person to undergo treatment to benefit another person); see also FURROW ET 
AL., supra note 76, §19-4 n.5 (citing Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, to state that 
children born alive can sue their parents); Amana, supra note 77, at 57 (“As with McFall v. 
Shimp, it is difficult to change the questionable moral obligation into a legal one.”); Gal-
lagher, supra note 76, at 23–24 (citing McFall, and Judge Flaherty’s refusal to compel one 
individual to undergo a bone marrow procedure to save his cousin); Grizzi, supra note 77, 
at 488–89 & n.70 (noting the courts refusal to allow one person to undergo medical 
treatment on behalf of another); Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn Children, supra note 
77, at 27 (citing McFall as stating that courts have preceluded forced surgeries to benefit 
“born persons”); Samuels et al., supra note 77, at 108 (quoting the McFall decision).   
 79 McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91. 
 80 These circumstances are limited to matters concerning the general public health and 
dependents who might be abandoned by the patient’s death.  See MEREDITH, supra note 
72, at 48 (citing the outcome of a case which held that the state’s interest in protecting a 
patient’s children outweighed the patient’s right to refuse treatment); Gallagher, supra 
note 76, at 23–26 (explaining that judicial refusal to allow one person to be compelled 
physically to aid another is based on the common law principle of self-determination); Er-
ic M. Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery:  A Threshold 
Question, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 281–82 (1994) (addressing financial and emotional 
concerns of leaving a child without a parent, and concerns that threaten public health 
and safety); Robin M. Trindel, Note, Fetal Interests vs. Maternal Rights:  Is the State Going Too 
Far?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 743, 749 (1991) (noting the state’s interest in the protection of a 
dependent third party in cases where a pregnant woman’s decisions may result in aban-
donment of a minor child).   
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v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.81  Recognizing a common law 
right to refuse medical treatment rooted in the right to informed 
consent, the Court held that there was a constitutionally protected li-
berty interest in refusing medical treatment.82  The Court cited cases 
recognizing the right to be let alone from bodily intrusion in the con-
text of searches and seizures involving the body; an unwanted medi-
cal examination for the purposes of discovery in a civil action; an un-
wanted vaccination that would compromise the patient’s health; the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs; mandatory behavior 
modification; and unnecessary confinement for medical treatment.83  
The Court also cited the four countervailing state interests that it 
identified in the context of the common law right to refuse medical 
treatment:  (1) the prevention of suicide; (2) the preservation of life; 
(3) the protection of third parties; and (4) the preservation of the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession.84  Thus, it is likely that the 
analysis for balancing an individual’s right to refuse medical treat-
ment under the Constitution against relevant state interests is similar 
or identical to that of the common law. 
 
 81 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 82 See id. at 278–79 (following other cases which support a liberty interest in refusing to re-
ceive medical treatment).  While the majority opinion recognizes a liberty interest in re-
fusing medical treatment, three Justices dissented, arguing that the Constitution provides 
a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.  See id. at 302–12 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
 83 See id. at 269, 278–79 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S 250, 251 (1891) (“No 
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”); 
see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (noting the existence of “a 
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480, 494 (1980) (stating that transport to a medical center along with forcible behavioral 
treatment was against one’s liberty interest); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) 
(“[A] child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being con-
fined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . .”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 
(1957) (“As against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable . . . must 
be set the interests of society . . . .”);  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–30 (1905) 
(noting that the court balanced a person’s interest in declining a smallpox vaccine versus 
the State’s interest in public health).   
 84 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. 
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C. The State Interest in Fetal Life as a Legal Justification for Compelled 
Treatment 
Courts overriding a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treat-
ment85 justify their decision by citing a countervailing state interest in 
fetal life.  This can be viewed as either the state interest in protecting 
life, the state interest in protecting third parties, or a combination of 
the two.86  However, protection of fetal life does not fit neatly into the 
four countervailing state interests identified in Section III.B.  Some 
courts and commentators have cited it as a separate, fifth state inter-
est, noting that preservation of life refers to the life of the decision 
maker, and that the third-party exception has been limited to born 
children and the public health.87 
The Supreme Court recognized a state interest in protecting fetal 
life in Roe v. Wade.  While in Roe the Supreme Court made clear that 
the fetus is not a person under the 14th Amendment,88 it also held 
 
 85 Courts generally compel medical treatment through a court order, which is often accom-
panied by an order awarding custody of the fetus, and therefore custody of the mother, to 
a state agency or hospital.  Most compelled treatment cases do not result in reported opi-
nions, making them difficult to track and limiting public scrutiny.  See Nancy K. Rhoden, 
The Judge in the Delivery Room:  The Emergency of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
1951, 1951 (1986).  A New England Journal of Medicine study published over twenty years 
ago that tracked court-ordered medical treatment of pregnant women found twenty-one 
cases of court orders being sought for Cesarean surgeries.  See Veronika E. B. Kolder et 
al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1192 (1987).  Orders 
were obtained in 86% of the cases in which they were sought, spanning eleven states.  See 
id.  In addition, hospital detentions were obtained in two states.  See id.  However, there 
are only a handful of reported cases from this period.  See infra notes 109–112 and ac-
companying text.  The practice of obtaining court ordered medical treatment has con-
tinued throughout the last two decades.  See, e.g., Lisa Collier Cool, Could You Be Forced to 
Have a C-Section?, BABY TALK, May 20, 2005, at 56, 57; LYNN M. PALTROW, NAT’L 
ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, COERCIVE MEDICINE (Mar. 21, 2004), 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/Coercive_Medicine.pdf (outlining numer-
ous cases and incidents where a court has forced a woman to undergo a C-section even 
though the woman wished not to do so). 
 86 See Trindel, supra note 80, at 749–50 (noting that a state’s interest may be in preserving 
“life” or protecting the “innocent third party”). 
 87 See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (discussing the four 
countervailing state interests but then resting on the “ultimate issue, the State’s interest in 
protecting the viable fetus”); see also Goldberg, supra note 72, at 597–99 (stating that “no 
trade-off between a woman’s health and the state’s interest in protecting potential life is 
permissible”); Levine, supra note 80, at 278–87 (noting the distinction between the pre-
servation of life and the preservation of potential life, and the State’s interest in protect-
ing third parties such as already born, minor children).   
 88 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58, 162 (1973) (noting that the word “persons” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies only postnatally and does not include the unborn); see 
also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 40 (noting that the United States has never treated the 
unborn as though they were a “person”); Goldberg, supra note 72, at 601 (explaining 
that, as determined by Roe, the Fourteenth Amendment’s use of “person” does not in-
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that the state has a legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in 
protecting not only the health of the woman, but also the life of the 
fetus.  In Roe, the Court identified the state’s “important and legiti-
mate interest in potential life,” which becomes compelling at viabili-
ty.89  The Court identified viability as a turning point at which “the fe-
tus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother’s womb.”90  At that point, the state may regulate and even 
 
clude a fetus).  Historically, the U.S. legal system treated the fetus as part of the woman 
bearing it and afforded it no separate rights.  See Harris, supra note 72, at 137 (stating that 
the fetus is legally perceived as part of the woman and thus has no “recognized legal exis-
tence”); Trindel, supra note 80, at 745 (describing the fetus as one that lacks existence or 
personality due to its attachment to the mother, making it unable to pursue a legal 
claim); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights:  Conflicts with Women’s Constitu-
tional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600–01 (1986) (noting 
that the law was reluctant to provide a fetus with legal rights since it is not a person in the 
whole sense).  To the extent fetal rights were recognized, they were contingent upon live 
birth and were available only against third parties and not against the mother.  See id. at 
600–02.  For example, fetuses were granted the status of a person for the limited purpose 
of inheritance, provided the fetus was subsequently born alive, in order to effect parents’ 
wishes to provide for children not yet born at the time of their death.  See id. at 601.  After 
1946, tort law in some states began to allow children born alive to recover against third 
parties for injuries inflicted while they were in the womb.  See  Developments in the Law—
State Intervention During Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1559 (1990) [hereinafter De-
velopments—State Intervention]; Goldberg, supra note 72, at 600–01 (noting that in some ju-
risdictions, the requirement that a live birth occur in order for a suit to be brought has 
been abandoned); Johnsen, supra, at 601–02 (explaining that the purpose of tort law—to 
compensate victims and deter such harmful conduct—is consistent with allowing a child 
to recover against third parties for conduct inflicted upon the pregnant mother).  Crimi-
nal law traditionally punished only third-party assaults on a fetus that survived birth.  See  
Developments—State Intervention, at 1560. 
   Over the past few decades, legislatures and courts have eroded the legal distinction 
between born children and those in utero.  In recent years, several states have amended 
existing murder statutes or enacted specific feticide statutes, imposing criminal sanctions 
against third parties even if the fetus died before birth.  See id. at 1559.  Similarly, states 
now recognize wrongful death recovery against third parties for harm to a viable fetus 
that dies before birth.  See Developments—State Intervention, at 1559; Harris, supra note 72, 
at 745; see also Johnsen, supra, at 602.  While by virtue of their exclusion of mothers from 
liability these statutes do not directly conflict with the rights of mothers, they represent a 
conceptual move by recognizing fetal rights independent of the pregnant woman.  See id. 
at 603–04. 
   More troubling, however, is the recognition of actions on behalf of the fetus against 
the pregnant woman for her conduct during pregnancy.  States have amended—or courts 
have interpreted—child abuse statutes to cover not only born children, but also fetuses.  
See Developments—State Intervention, supra, at 1574–75; Johnsen, supra, at 604–05.  Some 
courts have interpreted criminal statutes protecting fetuses to hold women liable for con-
duct during pregnancy even where the statutes unambiguously exclude pregnant women 
from liability.  See Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn Children, supra note 77, at 26. 
 89 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; see also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 15 (quoting Roe regarding the 
state’s interest in potential life). 
 90 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
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proscribe abortion, subject to an exception for the life or health of 
the mother.91 
Courts have interpreted this state interest as providing legal 
grounds to override a pregnant woman’s right to refuse treatment.  
For example, in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Cen-
ter, Inc., the Northern District of Florida held that a pregnant wom-
an’s rights were not violated by a court-ordered Cesarean surgery and 
blood transfusion.92  Citing Roe for the proposition that a State pos-
sesses an “increasing interest in preserving a fetus as it progresses to-
ward viability,” the court concluded that “[w]hatever the scope of Ms. 
Pemberton’s personal constitutional rights in this situation, they 
clearly did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in pre-
serving the life of the unborn child.”93  Indeed, every post-Roe re-
ported opinion compelling the medical treatment of a pregnant 
woman for the benefit of the fetus has relied on Roe in its argument 
that the state’s interest in fetal life outweighs the mother’s right to 
refuse treatment.94 
D. Limitations of the State Interest in Fetal Life as a Legal Justification for 
Compelled Medical Treatment 
Until Carhart, Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence provided 
limited support for the assertion that the state’s interest in fetal life 
can override a pregnant woman’s right to refuse medical treatment.  
This is in part because of the inherent limitations in applying abor-
tion jurisprudence to medical treatment cases, as well as the primacy 
Roe and its progeny put on a woman’s health. 
One of the limitations of applying abortion jurisprudence to 
compelled treatment is that the state interest in fetal life is not impli-
cated in the same manner in compelled treatment cases.  In the con-
 
 91 See id. at 163–64 (noting that a state may proscribe abortion if the fetus is viable and it will 
not endanger the health of the woman). 
 92 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999). 
 93 Id. at 1251. 
 94 See id.; In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233, 2239 (D.C. 1986) (citing Roe to dis-
cuss the state’s compelling interest in forcing treatment); In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 
N.Y.S.2d 898, 899–900 (1985) (noting that the state’s interest increases and becomes 
compelling when the fetus reaches viability); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. 
Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that the intrusion involved 
in the treatment is outweighed by the state’s interest in the fetus); see also In re A.C., 533 
A.2d 611, 613–15, 617 (App. D.C. 1987) (noting the difference between a woman’s right 
to an abortion and her obligations to the fetus once it becomes viable), vacated 573 A.2d 
1235 (App. D.C. 1990).  A court refusing to compel treatment also recognized the state’s 
interest in fetal rights under Roe as the crux of the argument for the parties urging com-
pelled treatment.  See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
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text of abortion, fetal life will certainly be terminated; this is one of 
the purposes of abortion.  However, medical treatment cases do not 
involve the purposeful termination of fetal life.  Instead, they concern 
differences of opinion in how to achieve a live birth.  While abortion 
involves the certain termination of fetal life, medical treatment cases 
involve disagreements over risk to fetal life. 
Some medical treatment cases involve disagreement over what is 
an acceptable degree of risk to fetal life.  For example, in Pemberton, 
the patient argued that vaginal delivery did not pose an appreciable 
risk to the fetus.95  Five physicians had testified that the risk of uterine 
rupture, however, was “unacceptably high.”96  One physician esti-
mated the risk at 4 to 6%, and another placed the risk at between 2% 
and 2.2%.97  Although the court stated that uterine rupture would re-
sult in “almost certain death” to the fetus, the one physician it cited 
estimated a 50% chance of fetal death if uterine rupture occurred.98  
The Northern District of Florida held that these odds posed unac-
ceptable risk to the fetus.99  However, a medical decision that allows a 
1-3% chance of fetal death implicates a far different degree of state 
interest in fetal life than an abortion. 
Physician uncertainty also raises the question of whether statistics 
themselves can be trusted to provide an accurate assessment of risk 
and whether a given risk even exists.  Medicine is inherently impre-
cise, and physicians often overestimate the potential harm to the fe-
tus and the need for intervention.100  In In re Baby Boy Doe, a mother 
delivered a healthy baby vaginally despite her physician’s urging to 
the court that insufficient oxygen flow to the fetus would result in the 
baby being born dead or severely retarded unless a Cesarean surgery 
 
 95 Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1252–53 (N.D. Fla. 
1999). 
 96 Id. at 1253. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. (noting the substantial risk of uterine rupture and death to the fetus). 
100 See MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 6, 65–66 (noting numerous cases where the medical out-
come differed from the percentages given by the doctors); Janna C. Merrick, Caring for the 
Fetus to Protect the Born Child?  Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Coerced Obstetrical Intervention, in 
THE POLITICS OF PREGNANCY:  POLICY DILEMMAS IN THE MATERNAL-FETAL RELATIONSHIP 
63, 73–75 (Janna C. Merrick & Robert H. Blank eds., 1993) (discussing several cases 
where medical percentages suggested that vaginal delivery was impossible and yet success-
ful vaginal deliveries occurred); Developments—State Intervention, supra note 88, at 1583 
(“First, medicine is an inherently imprecise science.”); Trindel, supra note 80, at 757–58 
(stating that doctors cannot make entirely accurate guesses as medical uncertainty usually 
exists).   
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was performed.101  In an unreported Colorado case, an order compel-
ling a Cesarean surgery was granted only to discover that the diagno-
sis of fetal hypoxia prompting surgery was incorrect.102  A 1987 New 
England Journal of Medicine survey showed that physicians inaccurately 
predicted harm to the fetus in over twenty-eight percent of the cases 
in which court orders compelling treatment were sought.103 
Changing medical knowledge underscores the uncertainty under-
lying the state’s interest in fetal life in medical treatment cases.  Thir-
ty years ago, a diabetic pregnant woman’s refusal of DES treatment 
and an x-ray would be considered a danger to her fetus.104  Physicians 
now know that these procedures endanger the fetus and would un-
dermine, rather than further, any state interest in fetal life to compel 
them.  While changing medical knowledge may introduce more 
grounds for medical intervention, it is also likely to undermine the 
need for several interventions that physicians now feel are optimal or 
necessary.  For example, many experts are beginning to question the 
efficacy of electronic fetal monitoring (EFM), which is commonly 
used to determine the need for Cesarean surgery due to fetal dis-
tress.105 
Even to the extent that the state’s interest in fetal life is indicated 
in medical treatment cases, the primacy of the mother’s health limits 
the state’s ability to compel medical treatment.  Roe provides that, 
while the state’s compelling interest in fetal life allows it to proscribe 
abortion in the third trimester, it may not proscribe abortion when 
doing so would endanger the life or health of the mother.106  Health 
 
101 See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 327, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that, al-
though a doctor determined that an immediate C-section was necessary, the vaginal birth 
produced a healthy baby); see also George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans:  The Most Unkindest 
Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (1982) [hereinafter Annas, Forced Cesareans] 
(showing that a medical diagnosis is not always accurate and arguing that a woman 
should be able to decide what procedures to have done regarding her fetus). 
102 See Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 101, at 16 (quoting the doctor who stated that the 
case “simply underscores the limitations of continuous fetal heart monitoring as a means 
of predicting neonatal outcome”). 
103 See Kolder et al., supra note 85, at 1195 (noting that the prediction of harm to the fetus 
was incorrect in six of twenty-one cases (just over 28%)); Trindel, supra note 80, at 757 
(noting that doctors incorrectly predicted harm to the fetus in six of twenty-one cases that 
were reported). 
104 See Thomas B. Mackenzie et al., Commentary, Case Studies:  When a Pregnant Woman En-
dangers Her Fetus, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 25 (1986) (suggesting a potential problem 
that may have occurred twenty-five years ago regarding fetal treatment). 
105 See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
106 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (noting that abortion during viability may 
be proscribed except when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother); see also 
Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 101, at 17 (discussing that the state’s compelling inter-
est in preserving the life of the fetus does not outweigh the interest in the life or health of 
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must be broadly construed, encompassing not only physical well-
being, but also psychological and emotional well-being.107  Even after 
viability, when a state’s interest in fetal life becomes “compelling,” 
states may not pursue this interest at the expense of a woman’s 
health.  In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed that the state 
cannot sacrifice maternal health for the sake of preserving fetal life.108 
The logical corollary to this principle is that, even if the state’s in-
terest in fetal life ever allows it to mandate medical treatment of a 
pregnant woman against her will, the state may not do so if treatment 
would come at the expense of the woman’s health.  Courts should be 
foreclosed from mandating any treatment that would benefit the fe-
tus but would pose health risks to the mother.  The requirement that 
state interests in fetal life may not be pursued at the expense of fetal 
health is reflected in case law in which courts contemplate interven-
ing to further state interest in fetal life.  In general, while some 
courts, citing Roe, have been willing to intervene to mandate medical 
treatment of pregnant women for the benefit of the fetus, these cases 
have been limited to situations in which the treatment was arguably 
 
the mother); Goldberg, supra note 72, at 619 (explaining that “exemptions from state 
proscriptions on abortions are available for the health of the mother”); Levine, supra note 
80, at 258 (stating that the state may not prevent an abortion if doing so endangers the 
mother’s health); Trindel, supra note 80, at 750 (noting that no court has held that a 
woman must jeopardize her own health in order to protect her fetus).    
107 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (noting that medical well-being extends to 
physical, emotional, psychological and familial considerations); United States v. Vuitch, 
402 U.S. 62, 71–72 (1971) (discussing a holding that allowed an abortion for mental 
health reasons); see also Goldberg, supra note 72, at 619 (“Health has been broadly de-
fined.”); Levine, supra note 80, at 258 (stating that a woman’s “health” must be broadly 
construed to include physical, psychological and emotional well-being).  
108 In Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, the Court considered a statute that 
required a physician performing a post-viability abortion to exercise reasonable care to 
preserve the life and health of the fetus and to perform a technique that would provide a 
fetus with the best chance to be aborted alive unless it would pose a significantly greater 
medical risk to maternal life or health.  476 U.S. 747, 768 (1986), overruled on other 
grounds, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  The Court held 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it required a trade-off between maternal 
health and fetal life rather than requiring “that maternal health be the physician’s para-
mount consideration.”  Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768–69; see also Levine, supra note 80, at 
259 (noting a court’s issue with a Pennsylvania statute that balanced consideration for the 
fetus’s life with consideration for maternal health); Trindel, supra note 80, at 750–51 
(discussing the Thornburg decision and the unconstitutionality of an act that required a 
“trade off” between fetal health and maternal health).  The Court sustained the primacy 
of a women’s health over the state interest in fetal life in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, reaffirming the health exception requirement.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 
846, 850–51, 872, 879, 880 (continuing to note the primacy of the woman’s health when 
considering whether an abortion is a necessity). 
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in the medical interests of both the fetus and the mother.109  Courts 
do not always compel treatment where it is in the pregnant woman’s 
 
109 With the exception of one case decided prior to Roe, every reported case of compelled 
medical treatment of a pregnant woman that I found occurred in circumstances in which 
the physicians could argue that treatment would benefit the mother’s health as well as the 
fetus. 
   In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital, a 1981 case, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia gave the state temporary custody of a fetus and ordered a woman in her thirty-
ninth week of pregnancy to submit to a sonogram and Cesarean surgery.  274 S.E.2d 457 
(Ga. 1981) (per curiam).  The patient had complete placenta previa, and physicians es-
timated that there was a 99% chance that her child would not survive a vaginal delivery, 
and a 50% chance that she would not survive a vaginal delivery, as opposed to a near 
100% chance that both mother and child would survive a Cesarean surgery.  See id. at 
458–59.  The court concluded that the state’s interest in fetal life under Roe and Georgia 
law outweighed the infringement on the mother’s “wishes.”  See id. at 460. 
   In In re Jamaica Hospital, a New York trial court ordered a woman in her eighteenth 
week of pregnancy to submit to a blood transfusion to save the life of the fetus.  491 
N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (1985).  The court based its intervention solely on the state’s interest in 
preserving the life of the fetus under Roe, and acknowledged that it would not intervene if 
the patient were not pregnant.  See id.  However, the transfusion was recommended to 
save both the mother and the fetus.  See id.  The case has since been cited by other New 
York trial courts for the proposition that courts may compel the medical treatment of 
women in order to protect the health and welfare of a fetus.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship 
of Baby K, 727 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2001) (noting that the court has the au-
thority to take action to protect the life of a fetus); see also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 536 
N.Y.S.2d 492, 496 (1989) (citing In re Jamaica Hospital for the proposition that protecting 
health and welfare of a fetus is deemed “paramount” when a mother is refusing medical 
treatment). 
   In In re Madyun, the District of Columbia Superior Court granted a hospital’s peti-
tion for an order compelling a pregnant patient at term to undergo a Cesarean surgery.  
114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, 2240 (1986).  The court held that, while a competent adult 
may decline medical treatment for religious reasons, the state could override this decision 
based on its interest in protecting fetal life delineated in Roe.  Id.  While the decision 
speaks only in terms of risk to the fetus—and even acknowledges that the Cesarean sur-
gery posed “minimal risks to the mother”—, see id., a subsequent decision by the same 
court states that that the Cesarean surgery in Madyun was also recommended in the inter-
est of the mother’s health.  See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 n.23 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) 
(distinguishing A.C. from Madyun).  In this later decision, the same court would vacate a 
decision that ordered a Cesarean surgery that was not in the medical interests of the 
mother, and hold that a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment should be res-
pected in virtually all cases.  See id.  In doing so, the court distinguished Madyun in part 
because the surgery in Madyun was in the interest of the mother.  See id.   
   In Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 
(1999), the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that an order 
compelling a woman to submit to a cesarean section did not violate her constitutional 
rights.  Id. at 1257.  The court relied on Roe and its progeny for the principle that, “by the 
point of viability . . . the state’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus outweighs the 
mother’s own constitutional interest in determining whether she will bear a child.”  Id. at 
1251.  Because “[b]earing an unwanted child is surely a greater intrusion on the mother’s 
constitutional interests than undergoing a [C]esarean surgery to deliver a child that the 
mother affirmatively desires to deliver,” the court concluded that “the state’s interest here 
was greater, and the mother’s interest less, than during the third trimester situation ad-
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medical interest; for example, the Appellate Court of Illinois has ex-
plicitly stated that Illinois law prohibits courts from doing so.110  How-
ever, all reported decisions compelling the treatment of a pregnant 
woman for the sake of the fetus occurred in circumstances in which 
the physician could argue that the treatment would also benefit the 
pregnant woman.111  In contrast, where treatment would negatively 
impact the mother’s health, courts have either refused to compel 
treatment or have overturned compelled treatment on appeal.112 
 
dressed in Roe.”  Id. at 1251–52.  While the decision provided no discussion of how the 
Cesarean surgery would impact the patient, the surgery was recommended to avoid ute-
rine rupture, see id. at 1257, which would pose serious risks to the health and life of the 
mother.  See Kevin S. Toppenberg & William A. Block, Jr., Uterine Rupture:  What Family 
Physicians Need to Know, 66 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN. 823, 823, 826 (2002). 
   In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) 
(per curiam), the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a hospital’s appeal seeking a court 
order to compel a blood transfusion for a woman in the thirty-second week of pregnancy.  
Id. at 538.  The court appointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus, ordered the guardian 
“to consent to such blood transfusions as may be required and seek such other relief as 
may be necessary to preserve the lives of the mother and the child,” and directed the trial 
court to “direct the mother to submit to such blood transfusions.”  Id.  It acknowledged 
that, while it was questionable whether an adult could be compelled to submit to transfu-
sions to save her life, “the welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and in-
separable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them with re-
spect to sundry factual patterns which may develop.”  Id.  However, unlike the other cases 
outlined in this footnote, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul was decided prior to Roe.  Thus, in contrast to 
the other cases outlined in this subsection, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul bases its holding upon the 
court’s perception of the rights of the fetus, rather than the state interest in fetal life.  In 
a subsequent case, New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. L.V., a lower court has 
since interpreted the New Jersey constitution to protect a pregnant woman’s right to 
refuse medical treatment even if that refusal results in her death or the termination of 
her pregnancy.  889 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005). 
110 See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that Illinois law 
did not allow a mother to be compelled to undergo medical treatment that would help 
her viable fetus). 
111 See supra note 109. 
112 In Taft v. Taft, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to order a cervical 
cerclage, a suturing of the uterus, on a pregnant woman at risk of losing her pregnancy in 
the fourth month due to an incompetent cervix.  446 N.E.2d 395, 395 (Mass. 1983).  The 
court cited the mother’s privacy rights and the fact that there were no findings based on 
expert testimony that described the risks to the mother or to the fetus or “setting forth 
whether the operation is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary as a life-saving 
procedure.”  Id. at 397.  The court also cited, in a footnote, the fact that the fetus was not 
viable, distinguishing the case from Raleigh Fitkin-Paul and Jefferson on those grounds.  See 
id. at 397 n.4.  Thus, the Taft decision may have left open the question of whether the 
court would be willing to compel treatment if a fetus is viable and if the operation were 
shown to be necessary to ensure the pregnancy was carried to term. 
   In In re A.C., decided two months before the Supreme Court recognized the right to 
refuse medical treatment, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that a 
pregnant woman’s rights were violated by an order compelling a Cesarean surgery.  573 
A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).  The Cesarean surgery increased the chances of survival for the 
twenty-six week fetus but would hasten the mother’s death.  See id. at 1239–40.  The pa-
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IV.  CARHART’S IMPACT ON PREGNANT WOMEN’S RIGHT TO MAKE 
TREATMENT CHOICES 
A. Introduction 
As described above, there are limitations in interpreting abortion 
jurisprudence in the context of medical treatment refusal cases.113  
Abortion is generally about a decision to end a pregnancy, as op-
posed to choosing or refusing treatment options while carrying a 
 
tient had refused the Cesarean surgery despite difficulties in communicating while on a 
ventilator; however, the judge had indicated that he was uncertain what her intent was.  
See id.; George J. Annas, She’s Going to Die:  The Case of Angela C., 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
23, 24 (1988) [hereinafter Annas, Angela C.].  Her family had also argued she would not 
have consented to the Cesarean surgery.  See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1239–40.  The trial 
court ordered the procedure; the nonviable fetus died two hours later, and the mother, 
now both recovering from major surgery and faced with the knowledge of her child’s 
death, died two days later.  See Annas, Angela C., at 24. 
   The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred, citing the right of every pa-
tient to informed consent and the right to refuse medical treatment.  See In re A.C., 573 
A.2d at 1243–45.  The court held that, although courts have “in rare cases” judicially over-
ridden a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment in the interest of protecting fetal 
third parties, “a court must determine the patient’s wishes by any means available, and 
must abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or compelling reasons to 
override them.”  Id. at 1246–47.  The court spoke harshly against overriding a pregnant 
woman’s refusal of medical treatment, but did not go so far as to overrule its previous 
holding in Madyun.  It distinguished Madyun and Jefferson in part because the treatment 
ordered in these cases did not conflict with the health interests of the mother.  See id. at 
1252 n.23.  The court also distinguished Madyun as involving a full-term fetus.  See id. 
   In In re Baby Boy Doe, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that a woman cannot be 
compelled to undergo a treatment as invasive as a Cesarean surgery, even if her choice 
might be harmful to her fetus.  632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  Physicians testified 
that, because of the lack of oxygen the fetus was receiving in the womb, the fetus had al-
most no chance of surviving the natural child birth the mother had chosen and if he did 
survive birth he would be mentally disabled.  See id. at 328.  In contrast, the child had a 
near one-hundred percent chance of surviving a Cesarean surgery.  See id.  In refusing to 
compel treatment, the Baby Boy Doe court explicitly relied upon the health risks to the 
mother, as well as the language in Roe and its progeny prohibiting a trade-off between the 
woman’s health and the life of the fetus.  See id. at 333.  The court noted that the Cesa-
rean surgery increased the risks of death for the mother, would be more painful to the 
mother, would require additional recuperation, and could lead to additional complica-
tions.  See id. at 328–29.  The court cited Thornburgh for the principle that “the woman’s 
health is always the paramount consideration; any degree of increased risk to the wom-
an’s health is unacceptable.”  Id. at 333.  Because a Cesarean surgery “by its nature, 
presents some additional risks to the woman’s health,” particularly when “recommended 
solely for the benefit of the fetus,” the court found that “[u]nder Thornburgh, then, it ap-
pears that a forced [C]esarean section, undertaken for the benefit of the fetus, cannot 
pass constitutional muster.”  Id.  The court left open, however, the question of whether a 
court could order a woman to submit to a less invasive treatment, such as a blood transfu-
sion, that would pose no risks to the mother, which it subsequently refused to do in In re 
Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405–06. 
113 See supra Section III.D.   
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pregnancy to term.  Yet the two bodies of law involve similar rights 
and principles.  As Stenberg and Carhart demonstrate, abortion juri-
sprudence is often about a patient’s right to make medical treatment 
decisions.  While this right was subtext in Roe and Casey,114 it was the 
crux of the issue in Stenberg and Carhart.  Both Stenberg and Carhart 
concerned women’s ability to choose a safer method of abortion pro-
cedure rather than whether they could obtain an abortion.  What was 
at issue in both cases was not the right to choose whether to become 
a parent, but rather the right to choose the medical procedure that 
would give effect to that right.115 
This section argues that the Carhart decision has implications not 
only for abortion jurisprudence but also pregnant women’s right to 
refuse medical treatment.  Subsection IV.B argues that Carhart’s rea-
soning encourages more state intervention in the medical treatment 
of pregnant women who seek to carry their pregnancy to term by re-
cognizing new or expanded state interests and abridging the primacy 
of women’s health.  Subsection IV.C discusses these implications in 
the context of specific medical treatment choices, such as Cesarean 
surgery, the treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women, and fetal 
surgery. 
B. Applying Carhart to Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Treatment 
The Carhart decision may influence cases concerning the medical 
treatment of pregnant women in several ways.  The decision expands 
the state interests that the Court recognizes as justifying intrusion in-
to women’s medical treatment decisions during pregnancy.  The ma-
jority’s reasoning also implicitly weakens women’s right to informed 
consent in the context of medical decisions during pregnancy.  Final-
ly, the decision undermines the principle that a woman’s health can-
not be compromised to further the state interest in protecting fetal 
life. 
In the context of a pregnant woman’s right to refuse medical 
treatment, Carhart’s expansion of the state’s interest in fetal life ex-
pands the justification for states to compel medical treatment.  As 
discussed above, in medial treatment cases, the state’s interest in fetal 
life is not as compelling as in abortion cases:  such treatment cases in-
volve risk to the fetus’s life or health, but not the termination of fetal 
 
114 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
115 See Hill, supra note 62, at 325 (discussing Carhart I and II in the context of reproductive 
choice). 
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life at issue in abortion.116  Fetal life is implicated far more in these 
cases than in Carhart, which concerned the method of abortion ra-
ther than whether a fetus would be aborted.  Courts may determine 
that, if the state’s interest in fetal life justifies state intrusion into 
women’s medical decisions in Carhart, it is an even stronger justifica-
tion for intrusion into the medical treatment decisions in cases where 
there is evidence that a fetus may live or die depending on a chosen 
course of medical treatment. 
Carhart encourages the argument that intervention in these cases 
is necessary to further a state interest in demonstrating its respect for 
fetal life.  Carhart allowed the state to ban a procedure that the major-
ity opinion found morally reprehensible because it undermined re-
spect for fetal life.  This reasoning can be translated to other medical 
treatment decisions that courts also find abhorrent to the principle of 
respect for fetal life.  The decision to risk a child’s death during birth, 
asphyxiation in utero, a painful and debilitating birth defect, or a 
chronic and debilitating disease may logically strike a court as raising 
moral issues at least as serious as the choice of an intact D&E over 
another method of abortion.  The court may also see these decisions 
as raising ethical issues for physicians at least equal to the concerns 
the Court expressed over a physician’s performance of an intact 
D&E.  Thus, courts may see Carhart as allowing, or even compelling, 
intervention in these cases in order to further the state interest in 
“promot[ing] respect for life, including life of the unborn.”117 
Carhart’s interpretation of the state’s interest in protecting the 
health of the woman also undermines women’s autonomy in the con-
text of medical decisionmaking during pregnancy.  Carhart implies 
that, in the context of women’s relationships with the children they 
carry, pregnant women cannot be trusted to exercise informed con-
sent.  This has enormous implications for medical treatment cases, 
where a woman’s exercise of informed consent allows her to choose a 
course of treatment that poses increased risks for the fetus’s life or 
health.  Carhart’s reasoning indicates that the state need not respect 
women’s right to informed consent in the context of medical treat-
ment choices during pregnancy because of the regret she might feel 
if her decision harms her child. 
Indeed, this alleged state interest is arguably implicated even 
more in the context of compelled treatment cases than in Carhart.  
Carhart involved circumstances in which a woman who has decided to 
 
116 See supra Section III.C. 
117 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007). 
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terminate her pregnancy must decide which procedure to use to ac-
complish those ends.  In the context of medical treatment cases, a 
woman’s medical treatment decision may result in death or harm to 
the fetus she has decided to carry to term.  A woman who has decided 
to carry her pregnancy to term and is faced with the decision of 
whether or not to have a Cesarean surgery to increase the fetus’s 
chances of survival may already identify as a mother and have a strong 
bond of love with the child she carries.  It stands to reason that the 
loss of or harm to a child she has decided to carry to term could 
cause as much, if not more, regret than the choice of which medical 
procedure to use during an abortion.118 
Some scholars argue that while Carhart uses language reflecting 
the argument that abortion can be restricted to protect women from 
regret, the Court did not adopt this rationale as an independent basis 
for restricting access to abortion.119  As Reva Siegel notes, Carhart re-
lied heavily on Casey, which rejected justifications for restricting abor-
tion access that were rooted in gender stereotypes about women.120  
“Absent dramatic new developments,” Siegel writes, “the constitutio-
nality of a ban based on gender-paternalist justifications for restrict-
ing abortion would be determined in a doctrinal framework that pro-
tects women’s autonomy to decide whether to bear a child.”121  
Restricting abortion based on paternalistic desires to protect women 
from the regret they might feel by contradicting their natural roles as 
mothers would be “in deep tension” with the very precedent that the 
Carhart majority relies upon and purports to uphold.122 
While Carhart uses the language of Casey and its respect for wom-
en’s dignity to support its decision, it does so in a way that actually 
undermines these goals.  Although Carhart does not state that pro-
tecting women from their regret is an independent justification for 
restricting abortion access, it frames this very justification in the form 
of protecting women’s health, which is an independent justification 
 
118 It should be noted that many women who have abortions, including those that use the 
procedure banned by PBABA, identify as mothers and would prefer to carry their preg-
nancies to term, yet decide to terminate the pregnancy for reasons including medical ne-
cessity.  It stands to reason that a medical treatment decision that may cause harm or 
death to a fetus the woman intends to carry to term would cause as much potential regret, 
if not more, than the choice of which medical procedure to use during an abortion. 
119 See, e.g., Siegel, Dignity, supra note 71, at 1705, 1767–73 (discussing the court’s reasoning 
for creating the “undue burden” framework). 
120 See, e.g., id. at 1701–02, 1705, 1767–74 (asserting that Roe and Casey symbolize the fact that 
“women are able and entitled to decide their own life course, especially in the matters 
concerning family roles”). 
121 Id. at 1701. 
122 Id. at 1701–02, 1767–73. 
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for restricting abortion that was accepted by Casey as consistent with 
respecting women’s autonomy.  Carhart reinterprets the women’s 
health justification in a way that includes gender-paternalistic as-
sumptions about women’s roles and capabilities, taking a justification 
meant to protect women’s dignity and autonomy and reinterpreting 
it in a way that undermines these principles.  This reasoning, im-
ported into compelled-treatment cases, undercuts women’s ability to 
make autonomous medical decisions in the context of refusing 
treatment when doing so might cause harm or death to the fetus.123 
Also troubling is Carhart’s repudiation of the principle that there 
can be no trade off between the woman’s health and these state in-
terests.  Carhart allows the state to pursue these interests by interven-
ing in pregnant women’s medical treatment decisions at the expense 
of women’s health if the state can show a modicum of uncertainty 
about the effects of the medical treatment on women.  In the past, 
courts have avoided compelling treatment of pregnant women where 
doing so would compromise women’s health, with one court directly 
citing Roe for the principle that women’s health may not be sacrificed 
to further the state interest in fetal life.124  Indeed, an American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists article published two years 
prior to the Carhart decision that considered whether to seek court 
intervention when a woman’s refusal to undergo a Cesarean surgery 
poses risk to the fetus relied on Stenberg for its conclusion that treat-
ment may not be compelled because doing so would compromise the 
woman’s health.125 
Carhart calls this conclusion into doubt.  For the first time, the 
Court has allowed the state to ban an abortion procedure without any 
exception for the life or health of the mother.  The majority justifies 
this by citing the uncertainty about the need for a health exception 
and maintaining that, where there is uncertainty, courts can defer to 
 
123 Even if Carhart does not designate protecting women from decisions they may regret as an 
independent basis for restricting abortion, it need not do so to influence other cases con-
cerning women’s autonomy in medical treatment decisions.  In the context of compelled 
medical treatment, the Carhart court discussed numerous factors as justifying its conclu-
sion—the interest in fetal life, expressing respect for fetal life, and the regret women may 
feel over their decisions.  All of these factors may be imported to compelled treatment 
cases.  The Court’s consideration of the regret women might feel and the need to protect 
women from that regret signals that courts may weigh it with these numerous factors and 
may allow it to influence their conclusion, even if courts may not rely on it as an inde-
pendent basis for restricting women’s decisions. 
124 See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
125 See Richard L. Berkowitz, Should Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Delivery Be a Criminal Offense?, 
104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1220, 1220 (2004) (discussing whether a woman should 
have the right to refuse a Cesarean delivery). 
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the state and err on the side of state interests.  The Court’s willing-
ness to rely on slim and questionable evidence to generate uncertain-
ty implies that very little evidence may be needed to override a wom-
an’s health concerns. 
One potential way to distinguish Carhart from compelled treat-
ment cases is that while Carhart was a facial challenge to a statute, 
compelled treatment cases are more likely to occur on a case-by-case 
basis.  The Carhart majority justified their refusal to require a health 
exception by distinguishing facial and as-applied challenges and stat-
ing that a facial challenge required the respondents to demonstrate 
that the procedure was medically necessary in a large fraction of cas-
es.  It left open the possibility that the statute would not survive an as-
applied challenge where a particular woman could demonstrate that 
the procedure was medically necessary for her.  Compelled treatment 
cases will likely not involve a challenge to a statute, but rather case-
specific determinations that more closely resemble as-applied chal-
lenges. 
While this is a valid distinction that prevents Carhart from fitting 
neatly into the framework of compelled medical treatment cases out-
lined above, Carhart still provides troubling precedent for compelled 
treatment cases by eroding the primacy of women’s health.  Past Su-
preme Court cases made no distinction between the unqualified need 
for a health exception in facial challenges as opposed to as-applied 
challenges because there was no reason to distinguish these two types 
of cases.  As the dissent argues, the health exception is required to 
protect the exceptional cases and underscore the fact that in no cir-
cumstance may women’s health be undermined to protect fetal life.  
The majority, on the contrary, provides a holding that will require 
women to undergo less safe procedures in numerous circumstances.  
The majority argued that it could not find that the statute was un-
constitutional on its face because the respondents did not demon-
strate that the procedure was medically necessary in “a large fraction” 
of cases.126  This implies that the majority willingly accepted a ban on 
a procedure that is medically necessary in a small fraction of the cas-
es.  Perhaps more important, the majority’s deference to Congress in 
the face of medical uncertainty also means that, regardless of the 
fraction of cases in which the procedure may be medically necessary, 
any uncertainty allows the procedure to be banned.  If any lack of 
 
126 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Lead-
ing Cases, Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 269 (arguing that the court in Carhart “upheld 
an abortion restriction without knowing whether necessary abortions would in fact be 
barred”). 
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certainty requires complete deference to Congress, then a ban that 
might prohibit a medically necessary abortion in seventy-five percent 
of cases would survive constitutional scrutiny as easily as a ban that 
might prohibit a medically necessary abortion in twenty-five percent 
of cases.127  Thus, Carhart allows an intrusion into the medical treat-
ment decisions of women that it implicitly acknowledges will result in 
compromising women’s health. 
Carhart’s erosion of the primacy of women’s health is not necessar-
ily limited to facial challenges.  Carhart allows manufactured uncer-
tainty to undermine the principle that there can be no circumstance 
in which women’s health can be undermined to further state interests 
in fetal life (and, in the case of Carhart, other dubious state interests).  
There is no logical reason to hold that uncertainty can undermine 
this principle in facial challenges as opposed to as-applied challenges.  
If uncertainty can compromise the primacy of women’s health in fa-
cial challenges, why can it not be used to compromise women’s 
health in as-applied challenges or in the case of specific women seek-
ing to avoid unwanted medical treatment? 
This facial/as-applied distinction does not apply to the expanded 
state interests described above, which the state could assert in an as-
applied challenge or a compelled medical treatment case.  Thus, the 
Carhart majority’s argument that a state may limit a pregnant wom-
an’s medical options in order to promote an interest in fetal life ap-
plies in the context of any state action; the state could raise this justi-
fication in a facial challenge to a statute, an as-applied challenge to a 
statute, or an order compelling the treatment of a specific woman.  
Similarly, Carhart’s argument that the state may further its interest in 
women’s health by limiting their ability to choose medical procedures 
they may regret also applies in the context of any state intrusion, 
whether by statute or through an order compelling treatment. 
In sum, the principles set forth in Carhart allow states to compel 
medical treatment in more and more cases, relying on dubious state 
interests.  Carhart undermines the principle that these interests may 
not be pursued at the expense of maternal health.  As the following 
section sets forth, this reasoning supports compelled medical treat-
ment in a variety of contexts in which courts have heretofore been 
less likely to accept. 
 
127 Abortion Rights, supra note 5, at 270 (considering the implications of a health exception 
for allowing abortions under certain conditions of risk). 
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C. The Impact of Carhart’s Reasoning on Specific Treatment Choices 
1. Surgical Interventions 
The overwhelming majority of Cesarean surgeries are performed 
for the benefit of the fetus and do not provide any medical benefit to 
the pregnant woman.128  While Cesarean surgery has become a very 
common procedure, with rates increasing from 5% in the 1970s to 
31.1% in 2006,129 it is an invasive medical procedure for a woman, in-
volving major abdominal surgery.  During the procedure, the patient 
is anesthetized, an incision is made into her abdominal wall and ute-
rus, and various connective tissue are retracted so that the surgeon 
can reach in and remove the fetus through the incision.130  The 
surgeon then extracts the placenta and amniotic membranes from 
the uterine wall, sutures the uterus, and closes the several layers of 
the abdominal wall.131  Approximately ten percent of patients will 
hemorrhage excessively, requiring a blood transfusion.132  Afterwards, 
if the patient received spinal anesthesia, she must remain supine for 
eight hours.  She cannot eat for eight hours following the procedure 
and may have to take antibiotics to reduce the chance of infection.  
Cesarean surgery involves a significantly longer recovery time than 
vaginal birth. 
Cesarean surgery also involves additional risks for the mother.  
The risk to a pregnant woman’s life is four to five times greater than 
vaginal deliveries133 and “maternal morbidity is more frequent and 
 
128 See Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1220 (stating that many women undergo Cesarean sec-
tions “for the express purpose of benefiting their fetuses”); see also Telephone Interview 
with Howard Minkoff, Chairman, Dep’t of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Maimonides 
Hosp., (June 25, 2009).  Common indications for Cesarean surgery are “dystocia, fetal 
distress, repeat cesarean delivery, and breech or malpresentation.”  Levine, supra note 80, 
at 238 (listing the risks that women who receive Cesarean sections encounter). 
129 See Joyce A. Martin et al., Births:  Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REP. 1 
(2009) (noting that this percentage is an all time high for Cesarean deliveries); see also 
Levine, supra note 80, at 235 (placing the rate for a Cesarean section at over 20%).  This 
drastic increase has been the cause of considerable controversy, as some argue that the 
increase is due not merely to improvements in medical technology, but also convenience, 
economics, and fear of malpractice suits.  See Levine, supra note 80, at 236; see also Gal-
lagher, supra note 76, at 50 n.210. 
130 See Levine, supra note 80, at 237 (discussing the procedure for a Cesarean surgery). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 66–67 (asserting that despite the improvements in tech-
nology, the risk of maternal fatality with a Cesarean delivery remains higher than the risk 
posed by a vaginal delivery); Levine, supra note 80, at 238 (citing the potential harm that 
could result to the mother from a Cesarean surgery). 
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likely to be more severe.”134  Short-term risks involve reactions to anes-
thesia, excessive blood loss, bladder injury, and infection.135  Long-
term risks involve uterine rupture in subsequent labor and the need 
for Cesarean surgery in subsequent pregnancies.136 
Carhart’s reasoning changes the analysis in the overwhelming ma-
jority of Cesarean surgeries that are performed for the benefit of the 
fetus and without benefit to the mother.  While Cesarean surgeries in 
general clearly pose additional risks to the mother, it is not difficult 
to imagine the use of a single study demonstrating that risks were mi-
nimal in order to inject “uncertainty” into the court’s mind, just as 
questionable medical evidence was used to create uncertainty among 
the Carhart majority about whether a health exception was necessary 
for PBABA.137  While in the past the Court had ruled that uncertainty 
required courts to err on the side of the mother’s health, courts may 
feel free to err on the side of allowing state interest in the shadow of 
Carhart. 
This same reasoning can be expanded to compel medical treat-
ment in the context of fetal surgery.  Like the majority of Cesarean 
surgeries, fetal surgery is surgery that is performed to address fetal 
health issues, rather than maternal health issues.  During fetal sur-
gery, the surgeon makes an incision into the abdomen and uterus, 
similar to a Cesarean surgery, and exposes the fetus so that the fetus 
is partially outside the womb.138  While fetal surgery is still relatively 
experimental, it has been established that fetal surgery can provide 
“unequivocal, life-saving benefit” with regard to at least two congenit-
al anomalies.139  Risks of fetal surgery are infection of the incision or 
lining of the uterus, uterine rupture, premature labor and delivery, 
 
134 Levine, supra note 80, at 238. 
135 See id. at 239 (noting the short term risks of Cesarean delivery). 
136 See id. (discussing the long term risks of Cesarean delivery). 
137 For example, some studies suggest that elective, scheduled Cesarean surgeries might ac-
tually improve maternal health outcomes.  See, e.g., Howard Minkoff & Frank Chervenak, 
Elective Primary Cesarean Delivery, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 946, 946 (2003).  While these stu-
dies may not apply to the circumstances of a compelled treatment case, they merely dem-
onstrate how selective interpretation of studies can be used to create uncertainty about a 
particular medical treatment. 
138 See Lawrence J. Nelson, Of Persons and Prenatal Humans:  Why the Constitution is Not Silent on 
Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 184 (2009) (stating the procedure for fetal sur-
gery where the unborn child is medically treated in the womb). 
139 See Michael W. Bebbington et al., Open Fetal Surgery, in PRENATAL MEDICINE 493, 497 
(John M.G. van Vugt & Lee P. Schulman eds., 2006) (stating that open fetal intervention 
benefits CCAM (cystic adenomatoid malformation) and SCT (sacrococcygeal teratoma)); 
see also Nelson, supra note 138, at 184 (suggesting the benefits of open fetal surgery for 
particular life threatening congenital anomalies). 
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bleeding, leakage of amniotic fluid, and complications associated 
with anesthesia.140 
Similarly, Carhart’s reasoning supports increased intervention in 
the context of cerclage, a suturing of the cervix that is used to pre-
vent premature labor where a woman’s cervix is weak. Cerclage is on-
ly likely to be successful where a cervix has been properly diagnosed 
as incompetent, a diagnosis that is very difficult to make and can of-
ten be inaccurate.141  Risks include reaction to anesthesia, cervical in-
fection, cervical laceration, rupture of membranes, premature con-
tractions, and the inability of the cervix to dilate normally in the 
course of labor.142  While the Massachusetts Supreme Court over-
turned the performance of a cerclage in Taft v. Taft, the court relied 
in part on the lack of evidence that the cerclage was necessary and 
the lack of information provided about the risks it posed.143  Carhart’s 
reasoning expands state interests beyond the need to save fetal lives, 
arguably making the necessity of the operation less critical in a com-
pelled treatment case.  More importantly, Carhart’s erosion of the 
primacy of maternal health also makes the risks posed by the proce-
dure less dispositive where evidence can be presented that those risks 
are uncertain. 
2. Treatment of Pregnant HIV-Positive Women 
The medical treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women provides 
an example of a chronic medical condition that may generate tension 
between physicians’ recommendations and pregnant women’s treat-
 
140 See Bebbington et al., supra note 139, at 506 (examining the maternal risks of open ma-
ternal-fetal surgery). 
141 See, e.g., R.W. Rush et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Cervical Cerclage in Women at High 
Risk of Spontaneous Preterm Delivery, 91 BRIT. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 724, 728 
(2005) (discussing the variances and difficulties in making a diagnosis of “cervical incom-
petence”); Catrin Tudur-Smith et al., Individual Patient Data Meta-Analysis:  Cervical Stitch 
(Cerclage) for Preventing Pregnancy Loss in Women, 5 BMC PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 5, 5 
(2005) (“Several observational studies into the efficacy of cervical cerclage have claimed 
high rates of successful pregnancy outcome in women with a poor obstetric history attri-
buted to cervical incompetence . . . . Current data suggests that cervical cerclage is likely 
to benefit women considered to be “at very high risk” of a second trimester miscarriage 
due to a cervical factor, however identifying such women remains elusive . . . .). 
142 See Rush et al., supra note 141, at 728–29 (noting the deleterious effects of cerclage on 
some women). 
143 See 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. 1983) (The record is devoid of facts that support the 
judgment ordering the wife to submit to an operation against her consent.  We have no 
findings . . . describing the operative procedure, stating the nature of any risks to the 
wife . . . or setting forth whether the operation is merely desirable or is believed to be ne-
cessary . . . .). 
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ment choices.  HIV may be transmitted in utero and during child-
birth.  While all infants born to mothers living with HIV will test posi-
tive for HIV antibodies, this does not necessarily mean these infants 
will develop HIV.  Without medical intervention, the rate of transmis-
sion during pregnancy and birth is approximately 25.5%.144  Prophy-
lactic measures such as antiretroviral therapy (“ARV” therapy) and 
Cesarean surgery prior to the rupture of membranes reduce the pe-
rinatal transmission rate still further, to less than 2%.145 
While they are extremely effective at preventing mother-to-child 
transmission, ARVs and Cesarean surgery have numerous risks and 
side effects.  The side effects of ARV therapy range from unpleasant 
to life-threatening, including the following:  nausea; vomiting; diarr-
hea; a painful and potentially debilitating condition called neuropa-
thy that causes pain in the hands and feet; impaired functioning of 
vital organs such as the liver and the kidneys; bone marrow suppres-
sion; damage to the reproductive system; and increased risk of heart 
disease.146  Patients taking ARVs may also develop resistance to them, 
which could reduce a woman’s treatment options when ARV therapy 
is needed for her own health.147  Pregnant women who take ARVs for 
the sake of preventing transmission when their own health does not 
require ARV therapy may therefore shorten their own life as a result.  
 
144 Joseph P. McGowan & Sanjiv S. Shah, Prevention of Perinatal HIV Transmission During Preg-
nancy, 46 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 657, 658 (2000) (finding that perinatal HIV 
transmission was about 25.5% in a placebo group of pregnant women). 
145 Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in 
Public Health:  Reduction in Perinatal Transmission of HIV Infection—United States, 1985–2005, 
55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 592, 592 (2006) (“[R]eduction is attributed to 
routine HIV screening of pregnant women, use of antiretroviral . . . drugs . . . avoidance 
of breastfeeding, and use of elective [C]esarean delivery . . . .  With these interventions, 
rates of HIV transmission during pregnancy, labor, or delivery from mothers infected 
with HIV have been reduced to less than 2% . . . .”). 
146 See Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?:  An Argument Against Mandatory AZT 
Treatment of HIV-Positive Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 494–95 (1997) (“There 
are significant side effects to taking AZT.  Among these are bone marrow suppression, 
malaise, nausea, headaches, and occasional seizures.”); see also Kimberley M. Mutcherson, 
No Way to Treat a Woman:  Creating an Appropriate Standard for Resolving Medical Treatment 
Disputes Involving HIV-Positive Children, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 230–31 (2002) (dis-
cussing the “significant drug side effects” that “range from annoying to aesthetically un-
pleasing to life-threatening”).   
147 See Halem, supra note 146, at 501–02 (“[O]ne potential concern of pregnant women is 
the risk of developing an immunity to AZT, thus decreasing their long-term chance of 
survival.”); Mutcherson, supra note 146, at 231 (“A patient may derive benefits from be-
ginning [ARV treatment] while her immune system is relatively strong, but she may later 
find that she has developed resistance to drugs that she needs more desperately as her 
disease progresses.”).   
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Cesarean surgeries come with increased risks to the mother, and 
these risks may be magnified for women living with HIV.148 
Prior to Carhart, courts had little legal justification to mandate 
ARVs or a Cesarean surgery over the objection of an HIV-positive 
pregnant woman in order to reduce risks of transmission.  While Roe 
recognized a state interest in protecting fetal life, transmission of HIV 
is not equivalent to death; what is at issue is not death or even risk of 
death, but rather risk of the transmission of a serious, chronic dis-
ease.  Roe and subsequent cases made clear that treatment could not 
be compelled where doing so would harm the health of the mother.  
Compelled treatment would therefore be prohibited in the cases 
where ARVs could cause debilitating side effects or cause a woman to 
build up resistance prematurely.  This reasoning would also prevent 
courts from compelling Cesarean surgeries to prevent mother-to-
child transmission. 
Carhart’s reasoning can easily be interpreted to shift the balance 
of state interests and empower the state to mandate treatment.  
Courts may use Carhart’s purported state interests in promoting re-
spect for the fetus and preventing pregnant women from making 
medical decisions they might regret to justify mandating treatment 
that will reduce the likelihood that a pregnant woman will transmit 
HIV to her fetus.  Given the large degree of uncertainty about the ef-
fects ARVs may have on any given individual, courts may decide to err 
on the side of compelling treatment under Carhart; for the reasons 
stated in the previous subsection, courts may reach the same conclu-
sion with regard to Cesarean surgeries.149 
3. Other Medical Decisions 
In the context of fetal therapy, numerous additional medical deci-
sions can be the source of state intervention, such as treatment for 
gestational diabetes, fetal drug therapies to prevent premature labor, 
and even the requirement that women undertake significant dietary 
changes where, in rare circumstances, diet might otherwise lead to 
 
148 See Amana, supra note 77, at 60 (“[S]ome data indicate that the risk of complications 
[from c-sections] in HIV positive women may be higher than in negative wom-
en. . . . [C]esarean delivery . . . is associated with significant morbidity in infected wom-
en.”). 
149 While ARV therapy is a long-term treatment plan, rather than a single procedure, courts 
could order women to undergo treatment and report regularly to ensure their adherence 
much in the same way courts order and monitor drug rehabilitation.  Doing so would 
force women not only to undergo invasive drug therapy and endure its side effects, but 
also to undergo constant monitoring to ensure compliance. 
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severe birth defects.150  As new fetal therapy techniques are discov-
ered, more occasions for intervening in the medical decisions of 
pregnant women are likely to arise. 
In addition to fetal therapy decisions, more indirect treatment de-
cisions may also raise the ire of the state.  For example, physicians 
and courts may view the decision to undergo a home birth as unac-
ceptably risky to the fetus, particularly in a high-risk pregnancy.  In 
Pemberton, the court ordered a woman attempting a home birth to re-
turn to a hospital and submit to surgical intervention against her 
will.151  Similarly, failure to undertake bed rest can, in some cases, lead 
to premature labor and fetal demise.152  Indeed, in a recent unre-
ported decision, a Florida county court ordered, at the state’s re-
quest, that a woman in her twenty-fifth week of pregnancy remain 
hospitalized and confined to bed rest and submit to any treatment, 
including Cesarean surgery, that her physicians deemed necessary “to 
preserve the life and health of [her] unborn child.”153 
V.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF 
PREGNANT WOMEN 
A. Doctrinal Implications:  Women as a “Special Class of Persons” 
1. Introduction 
Expanding state power to compel treatment of pregnant women 
has significant constitutional law implications.  Specifically, com-
pelled treatment infringes on both constitutional liberty and equality 
guarantees by designating pregnant women as a special class of indi-
 
150 See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1220 (discussing the many voluntary procedures 
pregnant women undergo for the health of their babies); John A. Robertson & Joseph D. 
Schulman, Pregnancy and Prenatal Harm to Offspring:  The Case of Mothers with PKU, 17 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 23 (1987) (“The need for public policies to prevent avoidable 
prenatal injuries has arisen in several different contexts:  prenatal medical or surgical 
treatment and [C]esarean section; prenatal abuse of alcohol, heroin, and cocaine; exclu-
sion from workplaces posing prenatal hazards to offspring; and prenatal transmission of 
herpes and syphilis.”). 
151 See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1249–50 (N.D. 
Fla. 1999) (holding that the order compelling the pregnant woman to submit to a cesa-
rean section against her will did not violate the woman’s substantive constitutional rights 
and granting summary judgment to the hospital). 
152 See Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1220 (noting that pregnant women may undertake bed 
rest for preterm contractions). 
153 In re Unborn Child of Samantha Burton, No. 2009 CA 1167 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2009); 
see Brief of ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Burton v. Florida (No. 
ID09-1958) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2009).  The case is currently pending appeal. 
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viduals with limited autonomy.  The troubling nature of compelled 
medical treatment can be seen most clearly and addressed most effec-
tively by an approach that recognizes the intertwined nature of its li-
berty and equality implications. 
2. Compelled Treatment’s Implications for Women’s Liberty 
Compelling medical treatment of pregnant women deprives wom-
en of their right to bodily autonomy.  While many may argue that a 
woman who decides to carry her pregnancy to term assumes a moral 
duty to her fetus,154 the law does not impose every moral duty as a le-
gal duty.155  For example, a parent cannot be legally required to pro-
vide a life-saving bone marrow transplant for her child.156  While a 
parent may have a moral obligation to undergo the medical treat-
ment, courts may not compel it because doing so would infringe on 
the parent’s right to refuse medical treatment. 
Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women excludes preg-
nant women from the standard medical model of counseling and in-
formed consent.157  This cannot be justified by the state’s interest in 
 
154 See, e.g., Robertson & Schulman, supra note 150, at 24–25 (arguing that women who de-
cide to carry a child to term assume moral obligations to undergo medical treatment to 
ensure the child’s health); see also Merrick, supra note 100, at 68–69 (“[I]t is morally ir-
responsible to voluntarily bring an infant into the world but refuse to make reasonable ef-
forts to allow that child to be born healthy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
155 See Grizzi, supra note 77, at 498 (observing that establishing a duty of a mother to her fe-
tus in certain contexts could only be grounded on “a pronounced extension of duty prin-
ciples in prior case law”). 
156 See MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 28–29 (noting that no parent has ever been forced to un-
dergo surgery to save the life of a child); Amana, supra note 77, at 56 (“[A] mother is not 
legally required to donate a kidney if her child needs it; nor would an identical twin be 
forced to donate bone marrow to a sibling in need.”); Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 
101, at 17 (“No mother has ever been legally required to undergo . . . bone mar-
row . . . transplant[] to save the life of her dying child.”); Howard Minkoff & Lynn M. Pal-
trow, Melissa Rowland and the Rights of Pregnant Women, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
1234, 1235 (2004) (observing that courts have ruled that relatives cannot be compelled to 
submit to bone marrow transplants); cf. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90–92 
(1978) (holding that a terminally ill patient has no right to require a relative to submit to 
a life-saving transplant). 
157 See Goldberg, supra note 72, at 620 (“Requiring women to undergo unwanted treatment 
for the sake of their fetuses would deprive women of the liberty of choosing a course of ac-
tion, which choice is the crux of the informed consent decision.”); Rothman, supra note 
104, at 25 (“Competent adults in this society have the right to refuse medical treatment, 
even when it is believed to be life-saving.”); see also Gallagher, supra note 76, at 57–58 
(“Until a child is brought forth from the woman’s body, our relationship with it must be 
mediated by her.”); cf. Minkoff & Paltrow, Rights of Unborn Children, supra note 77, at 27 
(arguing that the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, which requires physicians to provide 
women seeking abortions with scientifically questionable information about the pain a fe-
tus might feel during the abortion “makes women and abortion providers a unique class, 
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fetal life, much less by the more amorphous and questionable interest 
in expressing respect for fetal life identified in Carhart.  Society’s in-
terest in fetal life may be deep-rooted and profound, but, as Sylvia 
Law has noted, “the sustenance the fetus needs is not society’s to give.  
It can only be provided by a particular pregnant woman.”158  Forcing a 
woman to undergo a medical treatment to further societal interests 
allows the state to determine for a woman what risks she must assume 
for the benefit of the fetus and physically appropriates her body to 
serve the state’s interest in the fetus.159  Such appropriation is so ab-
horrent to the concept of individual liberty protected by the Consti-
tution that courts have denied the state’s ability to demand similar sa-
crifices in the context of saving the lives of third parties or furthering 
a criminal investigation.160 
Carhart gives credence to an additional justification for compelled 
medical treatment that has gained popularity among anti-choice ad-
vocates in recent years:  namely, that curtailing women’s autonomy in 
this way benefits women and is necessary to protect their health and 
well-being.161  This justification posits that a woman will come to re-
gret a decision she makes before birth that results in harm to the 
child she carries and that this profound regret will cause her physical 
and psychological harm; denying her this choice is therefore neces-
sary to protect her health.162 
Such reasoning curtails women’s liberty by assuming, and rein-
forcing, that pregnant women have limited agency.  Some propo-
nents of the women-protective rationale argue that a woman cannot 
 
excluded from the standard medical model in which counseling is provided by a physi-
cian who uses professional judgment to determine what a reasonable individual would 
need in order to make an informed choice about a procedure”). 
158 Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1027 (1984). 
159 See Gallagher, supra note 76, at 42 (“[F]etal rights may be predicated upon a new set of 
parental duties . . . . [T]he state is virtually required to appropriate the woman’s body and 
life to the affirmative service of the fetus.  The pregnant woman, no longer treated as the 
virtual chattel of her husband, instead becomes the subject of the state . . . .”). 
160 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that the state cannot compel sur-
gery in order to obtain evidence of a crime without compelling circumstances); McFall, 10 
Pa. D. & C.3d at 91–92 (refusing to compel a bone marrow transplant to save the life of 
the potential donor’s cousin). 
161 For detailed discussions of the women-protective argument, see Siegel, New Politics, supra 
note 59, at 992–93 (outlining the spread and use of the woman-protective antiabortion 
argument); Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 5, at 1641(discussing the woman-protective 
rationale for restricting abortion).  See generally Turner, supra note 5 (discussing the ratio-
nale of the majority in Carhart). 
162 See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 1006–29 (discussing the rationale of South Dako-
ta’s abortion ban); Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 5, at 1651–56 (providing examples of 
the women-protective argument in the campaign to ban abortion in South Dakota). 
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exercise informed consent in a manner that causes harm to the child 
she carries because it goes against her very nature; thus such deci-
sions must have been the result of coercion, duress, lack of informa-
tion, or some other interference with the proper exercise of in-
formed consent.163  The women-protective argument accepted in 
Carhart deprives her of this decision while simultaneously arguing 
that it is protecting her right to informed consent; it makes the deci-
sion she would have made had she been truly exercising informed 
consent.164  It presumes that women are incapable of making in-
formed decisions about their pregnancy that contradict what the state 
has presumed to be their nature;165 thus, the state must make these 
decisions for them. 
While all such infringements on women’s autonomy are troub-
ling,166 they are particularly so where the state’s decision may come at 
 
163 See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 1008–10 (noting that supporters of woman-
protective abortion restrictions suggest “that no matter what a clinic tells a [pregnant] 
client or however great [the client’s] expertise, the abortion procedure inherently lacks 
consent because a pregnant woman cannot make a truly informed decision to give up a 
relationship with a child until after the child is born”). 
164 See id.  (“[W]omen making a decision to abort a pregnancy cannot knowingly consent to 
the procedure unless they are in the position of women making a decision to give up a 
child for adoption, and have the opportunity to reconsider their decision after the child’s 
birth.”). 
165 See Siegel, Right’s Reasons, supra note 5, at 1674–75 (observing that the “pro-woman” strat-
egy rests on the idea that “[t]he best interests of the child and the mother are always 
joined—even if the mother does not initially realize it, and even if she needs a tremend-
ous amount of love and help to see it”); see also Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, Gon-
zales v. Carhart:  How the Supreme Court’s Validation of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act Affects Women’s Constitutional Liberty and Equality, FINDLAW (May 7, 2007), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070507_mcclain.html (noting Carhart’s fo-
cus on “protecting women from ill-considered decisions” and the psychologically harmful 
effects of the decision to abort).  Overriding a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical 
treatment compels her to conform to what the state defines as her proper role as a moth-
er:  to nurture and protect the fetus she carries as best she can.  See Ian Vandewalker, 
Note, Taking the Baby Before It’s Born:  Termination of the Parental Rights of Women Who Use Il-
legal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 423, 429–32 (2008) (arguing 
that patriarchal views define motherhood as a woman’s most important role, and “mis-
conduct during pregnancy is taken as proof that the woman fails the model of the ideal 
mother”); cf. Johnson, supra note 88, at 612 (“If the state were to deprive women of their 
right to choose to have an abortion, it would impose on women a duty to bear unwanted 
children; by creating fetal rights susceptible to use against pregnant women, the state 
compels women who desire to bear children to reorganize their lives in accordance with 
judicially-defined norms of behavior.”).  This is also in stark contrast to the language of 
Casey, which warns against the state imposing its moral views on the roles of mothers.  See 
infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
166 Indeed, the health exception itself highlights the value judgments courts have made 
about women’s roles as potential mothers.  As Reva Siegel argues, “more than any sex-
based legislation the Court has reviewed in the modern era, the therapeutic exception [to 
abortion regulation] graphically defines women as childbearers” because, by allowing the 
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the expense of the pregnant woman’s health.  In these circumstances, 
the state requires a woman not only to sacrifice her autonomy, but al-
so her well-being.  She must subordinate her medical needs to the 
whim of the state and, in some situations, literally allow herself to be 
cut into, sutured, or injected with medication causing debilitating 
side effects.  She must risk complications, short-term and long-term 
side effects, and even death.  In one case, the court’s decision to 
compel treatment actually hastened a woman’s death before a higher 
court overturned it.167  Carhart potentially expands the state’s license 
to devalue and infringe upon women’s autonomy by allowing the 
state to subordinate women’s autonomy to the state’s interests—not 
only in fetal life but also in merely expressing respect for fetal life—
even where women’s health is compromised. 
3. Compelled Treatment’s Implications for Women’s Equality 
This infringement on autonomy and the underlying assumptions 
used to justify it also have significant constitutional implications for 
women’s equality.  Compelled treatment cases, like abortion cases, 
concern burdens that only women must bear, and assumptions about 
their unique role in society as child bearers.  Compelling women to 
undergo treatment for the sake of the fetus sets them apart as a sepa-
rate class of individuals with limited autonomy rights.  This “unique 
class” view is perhaps best illustrated by Judge Belson’s dissenting 
opinion in In re A.C.168  In A.C., the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals held that a compelled Cesarean surgery that hastened a 
 
state to regulate abortion except where doing so would threaten the life or health of the 
mother, the state defines the pregnant women’s liberty interest in abortion as merely one 
of “brute physical survival” and ignores many of the social, intellectual, or emotional 
stakes women may have in avoiding becoming parents.  See Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the 
Body:  A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 261, 365 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning].  In the context of com-
pelled medical treatment, some court’s willingness to compel treatment based on the in-
trusiveness of the treatment or the harm it might do the mother reflects this reasoning 
and demonstrates a lack of willingness to consider seriously a woman’s interests in con-
trolling her bodily autonomy unless she can demonstrate sufficient physical harm will re-
sult from compelled treatment. 
167 See In re A.C, 533 A.2d 611, 613–15, 617 (D.C. 1987) (“[The Court] well know[s] that we 
may have shortened [the pregnant mother’s] life span by a few hours.”), vacated 573 A.2d 
1235 (D.C. 1990); Annas, Angela C, supra note 112, at 24 (“Mrs. C., now confronted with 
both recovery from [a Cesarean section] and the knowledge of her child’s death, died 
approximately two days [after the court-ordered Cesarean section].”). 
168 573 A.2d 1235, 1253–56 (1990) (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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woman’s death violated her rights.169  Dissenting in part, Judge Belson 
argued:   
[A]woman who carries a child to viability is in fact a member of a unique 
category of persons.  Her circumstances differ fundamentally from those 
of other potential patients for medical procedures that will aid another 
person, for example, a potential donor of bone marrow for transplant.  
This is so because she has undertaken to bear another human being, and 
has carried an unborn child to viability. . . . [T]he expectant mother has 
placed herself in a special class of persons who are bringing another per-
son into existence, and upon whom that other person’s life is totally de-
pendent.170 
What Judge Belson refers to as a “special class” is, in reality, 
second-class citizenship that is unique to women.171  The state, acting 
on behalf of the fetus or the alleged interests of the woman herself, 
restricts a woman’s ability to control her body in a context that is par-
ticular to women:  childbearing.172  While not all women can or will 
become pregnant, women are unique in their capacity to become 
pregnant and give birth.  This uniqueness comes with significant 
burdens both biological—such as burdens on a woman’s health and 
mobility—and constructed by society—such as burdens on a woman’s 
independence and ability to earn income.173  Thus, reproductive deci-
sions concern both women’s autonomy and their ability to participate 
 
169 See id. at 1253. 
170 See id. at 1256. 
171 See Mackenzie et al., supra note 104, at 25 (mandating medical treatment of pregnant 
women for the benefit of the fetus raises the “danger of creating of pregnant women a 
second class of citizen, without basic legal rights of bodily integrity and self-
determination”). 
172 See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 76, at 43 (noting that the “fetal rights theory” would sup-
port making a woman subordinate from the early stages of pregnancy); Law, supra note 
158, at 955–56 (“[A]lthough men may be disadvantaged by their relatively minor role in 
reproduction, we have constructed a society in which men are advantaged, relative to 
women, in important material and spiritual ways.”); Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 166, at 
269 (“[T]he capacity to gestate distinguishes the sexes socially:  Judgments about women’s 
capacity to bear children play a key role in social definitions of gender roles and thus in 
the social logic of ‘discrimination based on gender as such.’”). 
173 See Law, supra note 158, at 956 (“Pregnancy and childbirth are . . . burdensome to health, 
mobility, independence, and sometimes to life itself . . . .”); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Ar-
guments for Reproductive Rights:  Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 
EMORY L.J. 815, 817–20 (2007) [hereinafter Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments] (outlining ar-
guments of a “sex equality” approach to reproductive rights, which gives “attention to the 
social as well as physical aspects of reproductive relations”); see also Siegel, Reasoning, supra 
note 166, at 274 (noting that “[b]ecause Roe and its progeny treat pregnancy as a physio-
logical problem, they obscure the extent to which the community that would regulate a 
woman’s reproductive choices is in fact implicated in them, responsible for defining mo-
therhood in ways that impose material deprivations and dignitary injuries on those who 
perform its work”). 
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as full members of society equal to men.174  Compelling medical 
treatment of women curtails this significantly by designating women 
as a class of citizens with limited abilities to make decisions that im-
pact both their own bodies and their place in society. 
The designation of women as a special class of citizens because of 
their reproductive capacity is rooted in and reinforces traditional ste-
reotypes about women’s social roles and capacities.  Early Supreme 
Court cases, written before modern equal protection jurisprudence, 
contain paternalistic language affirming the state’s right to regulate 
women’s roles in society because of their ability to have children.  In 
Bradwell v. State, an 1873 case in which the Supreme Court upheld a 
statute prohibiting women from becoming members of the bar, Jus-
tice Bradley justified the statute on the grounds that “[t]he natural 
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The pa-
ramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother.”175  In 1908, the Court upheld leg-
islation limiting the number of hours women could work, in part be-
cause “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physi-
cal well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and 
care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”176 
Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women continues this 
reasoning177 by reinforcing women’s traditional role as nurturers and 
 
174 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 383 (1985) (“Also in the balance [when discussing abortion 
rights] is a woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course . . . her ability to stand in 
relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”); 
Law, supra note 158, at 956 (“Pregnancy and childbirth are also burdensome to health, 
mobility, independence, and sometimes to life itself, and women are profoundly disad-
vantaged in that they alone bear these burdens.”). 
175 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
176 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).  Muller was decided only a few years after the 
Supreme Court struck down protective labor legislation that applied to male workers, ar-
guing that “limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn 
their living” failed to recognize men’s constitutional right to freedom of contract.  Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61–62 (1905); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them From 
Themselves:  The Persistence of Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1464, 1502–03 (2009) (comparing Lochner and Muller in the context of women-
protective labor laws). 
177 While this article focuses on the decisions of competent pregnant women in the context 
of medical treatment, the state has limited the autonomy of pregnant women based on 
their pregnancy in numerous other contexts.  For example, two-thirds of states either ex-
plicitly do not recognize or make it more difficult to enforce an advance directive if the 
patient is pregnant.  Daniel Sperling, Do Pregnant Women Have (Living) Will?, 8 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 333–34 (2005) (discussing regulation of pregnancy clauses 
throughout the United States).  Many states also provide harsher penalties for drug use 
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caregivers, whose first priority must be the well-being of others, par-
ticularly their children.  Tellingly, courts do not intervene where a 
mother is seeking to undergo surgery that might compromise her 
health for the sake of the fetus, even though ostensibly the state has a 
vested interest in preserving the health and life of the woman in 
those circumstances just as it has an interest in preserving fetal life.  
Women’s decisions in these situations, however, are not questioned 
because such a decision comports with stereotypes about women’s 
roles as mothers and their natural inclination to protect their child-
ren.  The women-protective argument embraced in Carhart makes 
this rationale explicit, referencing the bond of love women are pre-
sumed to feel for their children as a unique part of women’s nature, 
and using this to justify imposing restrictions on their autonomy.178  
Such arguments presume women are “impaired in their capacity to 
make life plans to the extent that their life decisions deviate from role 
expectations concerning women’s obligations as mothers.”179 
Modern Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence rejects 
traditional notions of women’s roles as a basis for state action.  While 
historically federal and state law often discriminated against women 
and justified such discrimination with traditional notions of differen-
tiated family roles, this reasoning was rejected in a line of cases be-
ginning in the 1970s which redefined sex discrimination jurispru-
dence and rejected sex-based state action premised on traditional sex 
roles.180  Such state action was rejected even where such actions pur-
 
during pregnancy.  See generally, Vandewalker, supra note 165, at 423 (noting that several 
states have “made the use of illegal drugs while pregnant a ground for terminating a 
mother’s parental rights). 
178 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“Respect for human life finds an ulti-
mate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.  The [Partial Birth 
Abortion] Act recognizes this reality as well.”); see also Grossman & McClain, supra note 
165 (“[I]n Carhart, Justice Kennedy . . . describes abortion as a ‘difficult and a painful 
moral decision’ and declares that the [Partial Birth Abortion Act] recognizes the ‘reality’ 
that ‘respect for life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for 
her child.’”); Hasday, supra note 176, at 1485–86 (“In Carhart . . . the argument that anti-
abortion laws protect women from regret has two central premises.  The first premise was 
that women’s fundamental nature was maternal.”); Siegel, Dignity, supra note 71, at 1792.   
179 Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 1036. 
180 In Reed v. Reed, the Court struck down a law in which men were preferred to women for 
estate administration purposes.  404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (“By providing dissimilar treat-
ment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated, the [law] violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.”).  Since Reed, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down sex-based 
classifications justified by traditional stereotypes about women’s roles as caretakers and 
men’s roles as breadwinners.  See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 995 (“In a series of 
equal protection cases . . . in the 1970s, the Court struck down sex-based laws premised 
on the male breadwinner/female caregiver model.”).  The Court held that military fringe 
benefits, social security benefits, welfare assistance, and workers’ compensation all must 
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portedly protect women;181 in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 
for example, the Court held that a policy of excluding males from a 
state nursing school violated the equal protection clause, stating that: 
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself 
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.  Thus, if the statutory objective is 
to exclude or “protect” members of one gender because they are pre-
sumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the 
objective itself is illegitimate.182 
Despite this strong language, the Court has tailored equal protec-
tion jurisprudence to provide little protection against state actions 
that enforce these stereotypes in the realm of reproduction and 
pregnancy.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court upheld a state operated 
 
be guaranteed to women to the same extent they are guaranteed to men.  See Wengler v. 
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (striking down Missouri workers’ compensa-
tion laws); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (finding the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children Act unconstitutional because it provided benefits only when the father 
becomes unemployed); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding that the So-
cial Security Act’s survivors’ benefits section was unconstitutional because it awarded fe-
male workers’ spouses less protection than male workers’ spouses); Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating a gender-based distinction mandated by a 
section of the Social Security Act); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (con-
cluding that sections of a statute awarding military fringe benefits violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).  Also offensive to the notion of sex equality was 
a Louisiana law that designated the husband as the head of the household with the unila-
teral right to dispose of jointly owned property.  See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 
456 (1981) (concluding that the Louisiana statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, Gender and the United States Constitution:  
Equal Protection, Privacy, and Federalism, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 306, 314–18 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Siegel, Gender and the Constitution] (“Modern equal protection law thus views sex dis-
tinctions in public law as presumptively unconstitutional.  In numerous cases . . . the 
Court has invalidated a variety of laws that drew distinctions on the basis of sex.”); see also 
Ginsburg, supra note 174, at 377–80 (outlining the 1970s gender discrimination cases). 
181 See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 995–96 (“The Court has also emphasized that the 
Constitution’s prohibition on laws enforcing gender-differentiated family roles extends to 
laws that purport to protect women.”).  Striking down an alimony statute that allocated 
benefits differently based on sex, the Court rejected the state’s ability to make laws with 
the objective of enforcing a family model “under which the wife plays a dependent role” 
and held that: 
[T]he old notion that generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provide a 
home and its essentials, can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the ba-
sis of gender. . . .  
 . . . . 
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of 
gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the proper 
place of women and their need for special protection. 
  Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279–80, 283 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
182 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); see also Siegel, New Politics, supra note 59, at 995–96 
(“Since . . . 1971 . . . the Court has never sustained laws having the objective or purpose of 
preserving or perpetuating gender-differentiated family roles.”). 
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disability income protection plan that excluded pregnancy, holding 
that in the context of equal protection, discrimination that is based 
on biological differences is not sex-based discrimination because the 
sexes are not “similarly situated” in that context.183  The Court rea-
soned that pregnancy discrimination does not involve “gender as 
such,” but rather “an objectively identifiable physical condition with 
unique characteristics.”184  The Court distinguished pregnancy dis-
crimination from sex-based discrimination on the grounds that, while 
all pregnant persons are female, the non-pregnant classification con-
tains both males and females.185  Pregnancy-based classifications were 
therefore shielded from the heightened equal protection scrutiny re-
served for sex-based classifications “[a]bsent a showing that distinc-
tions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an in-
vidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the 
other.”186 
The Court continued this line of reasoning throughout the 1980s, 
repeatedly upholding reproductive-based distinctions between men 
and women on the ground that the sexes are not similarly situated 
with regard to their ability to become pregnant.  In Michael M. v. Su-
perior Court, the Court upheld a statutory rape law that penalized only 
 
183 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974) (“Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnan-
cy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members 
of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with re-
spect to any other physical condition.”); see also Developments in the Law—Medical Technology 
and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1581–82 (1990) [hereinafter Developments in Law—
Medical Technology] (“The Supreme Court . . . has been skeptical of gender discrimination 
claims based on pregnancy.  Because the Court tends to see the disparate treatment as 
falling between the pregnant and the nonpregnant, rather than between men and wom-
en, it is unlikely to find an equal protection violation.”); Johnsen, supra note 88, at 620–22 
(“Current doctrine . . . offers women no protection against discrimination that is based 
on real biological differences between women and men, and in fact denies that such dis-
crimination is sex-based.”); Levine, supra note 80, at 291–92 (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
held that because of the unique nature of pregnancy and the biological differences be-
tween men and women, pregnant women and men are not similarly situated.”); Siegel, 
Reasoning, supra note 166, at 268–69 (characterizing Geduldig as holding “that pregnancy 
classifications are not sex-based”).  Congress subsequently abrogated Geduldig by passing 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which includes pregnancy classifications with-
in the definition of gender discrimination for the purposes of Title VII.  Pregnancy dis-
crimination is therefore unlawful in the context of employment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(1982) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy.”). 
184 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
185 See id. (“The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibil-
ity because of gender but merely removes one physical condition—pregnancy—from the 
list of compensable disabilities.”). 
186 See id. 
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men, arguing that the statute upheld the state interest in protecting 
teen pregnancy, and only teenage females are capable of becoming 
pregnant.187  The Court also upheld more stringent standards to de-
termine the citizenship status of children born abroad and outside of 
marriage to American men than those born abroad and outside of 
marriage to American women because “[f]athers and mothers are not 
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parent-
hood.”188  In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Court held 
that abortion protesters obstructing access to a clinic were not target-
ing women as a class, again distinguishing sex-based classification 
from pregnancy-based classification.189 
The Supreme Court has also foreclosed the argument that dis-
crimination in the context of reproductive rights violates the equal 
protection clause because its impact is to discriminate against women.  
The Court has interpreted the equal protection clause to apply only 
to actions that have discriminatory intent.190  State action that dispa-
rately impacts women because of their ability to become pregnant is 
only considered sex-based discrimination if it can be shown that the 
action was taken with the invidious purpose of discriminating against 
women as a class; otherwise, it is subject only to rational basis scruti-
ny.191 
The development of equal protection jurisprudence in a way that 
essentially forecloses most equal protection-based challenges in com-
pelled medical treatment cases unduly protects the very type of dis-
crimination the equal protection clause should prohibit.  In the con-
text of women it is the ability to bear children that has been the 
source of state limitations on their autonomy, whether in the context 
of their employment or their right to choose and refuse medical 
 
187 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (“Of particular concern to the State is that approximately half of 
all teenage pregnancies end in abortion. . . .  Only women may become pregnant.”). 
188 Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001). 
189 506 U.S. 263, 267–78 (1993) (“[C]laim that petitioners’ opposition to abortion reflects an 
animus against women in general must be rejected.”). 
190 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the 
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially 
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate 
impact.”); see also Levine, supra note 80, at 291–92 (“[T]he classification in court-ordered 
[C]esarean cases is not the result of discriminatory purpose, but rather, discriminatory ef-
fect . . . [which], in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish a violation of equal protec-
tion.”). 
191 Pregnancy discrimination may be challenged in the context of employment under Title 
VII.  See supra note 183. 
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treatment.192  It is this very historical discrimination that the Casey 
court rejected in the context of abortion193 and that Justice Ginsburg 
warned that the Carhart decision reinvigorates.194  Several scholars 
have criticized the chasm between reproductive rights jurisprudence 
and equal protection jurisprudence, and have proposed alternative 
ways to approach the equal protection doctrine that would account 
for the equality implications of infringements on women’s reproduc-
tive rights.195  For example, Sylvia Law proposes that courts scrutinize 
laws to ensure that the law has no significant impact in perpetuating 
“the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints 
on individual freedom.”196  If the law has this impact, Law proposes 
that it must be “justified as the best means of serving a compelling 
state purpose.”197 
Such an approach to equal protection would more fully address 
the troubling implications compelled medical treatment of pregnant 
women has for women’s equality and would make it more difficult for 
courts to compel medical treatment without running afoul of the 
equal protection clause.  Under Law’s analysis, compelled medical 
treatment would be subject to strict scrutiny because it has a signifi-
cant impact in perpetuating the oppression of women and culturally 
 
192 See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text; see also Johnsen, supra note 88, at 623 
(“State and social regulations concerning reproductive differences have served to create 
and reinforce separate and unequal sex-segregated spheres in the United States.”); Law, 
supra note 158, at 1009 (noting “how central state regulation of biology has been to the 
subjugation of women, the normal presumption of constitutionality”). 
193 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1992) (“Though abor-
tion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all in-
stances.”). 
194 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
195 See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 88, at 622 (“By dismissing claims of sex discrimination on the 
grounds that the sexes are differently situated in matters of reproduction, the Court ra-
tionalizes differential treatment of the sexes as legitimate and as merely ‘reflecting’ the 
fact of biological difference.”); Law, supra note 158, at 955 (attempting “to articulate a 
stronger constitutional concept of sex-based equality than that which currently exists”); 
Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 166, at 268–71 (criticizing the Court’s decision in Geduldig 
and subsequent decisions based on similar reasoning); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE 
L.J. 769, 913–15 (2002) (“The simple statement [in Geduldig] that the Court does not 
recognize pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination should be sufficient to demon-
strate the troubling narrowness of the Court’s definition of sex for the purposes of equal 
protection.  Closer examination of the sex discrimination jurisprudence, however, reveals 
an even more disturbing tension in the Court’s analysis.”). 
196 See Law, supra note 158, at 1008–09; see also Developments in Law—Medical Technology, supra 
note 183, at 1582 (“Sylvia Law proposes an alternative approach to equal protection that 
would eliminate the presumption of constitutionality attached to laws based on real bio-
logical differences.”); Johnsen, supra note 88, at 624 (stating that “[e]qual protection doc-
trine should incorporate the approach advocated by Professor Sylvia Law”).   
197 See Law, supra note 158, at 1009. 
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imposed sex-role constraints on their individual freedom.  Treatment 
could only be compelled if it were the best means of serving a com-
pelling state interest.  Under current abortion jurisprudence, the 
state’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling after viability; thus, 
treatment could only be compelled if it could be shown that it was the 
best means of preserving fetal life after viability. 
However, even a more robust equal protection analysis for repro-
ductive rights would be unlikely to provide a complete analysis of the 
troubling implications of compelled medical treatment.  Analyzing 
compelled treatment as an equal protection violation alone cannot 
fully realize its infringements on a woman’s liberty just as viewing 
compelled treatment only as an infringement on a woman’s liberty 
fails to fully realize its implications for women’s equality. 
A complete view of the implications of compelled medical treat-
ment requires acknowledgement of its affect on both the liberty and 
equality of women.  The next subsection discusses how these two in-
terests intertwine to form a hybrid claim based on dignity and how 
compelled medical treatment violates the dignity of women. 
4. Compelled Treatment and Women’s Dignity 
The previous two subsections discussed the liberty and equality 
implications of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women and 
how approaches that distinguish and separate these two interests fail 
to account adequately for the full harm caused by compelled medical 
treatment.  This subsection argues that an approach that recognizes 
the interdependent nature of these two interests can fully recognize 
and protect pregnant women’s reproductive rights in general and 
their right to avoid compelled treatment in particular. 
Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women distinguishes 
women as a “special class” with limited autonomy, infringing on both 
their liberty and equality interests.  Compelled medical treatment of 
pregnant women implicates women’s liberty by abridging their ability 
to control their own bodies; in doing so, it burdens women in ways 
men are not burdened and both relies upon and reinforces gender 
stereotypes about women’s role as mothers.  In this way, liberty and 
equality interests are inexorably intertwined in what Laurence Tribe 
has deemed a “double helix.”198  This double helix is, in essence, 
about protecting the dignity of autonomous decisionmaking and pro-
 
198 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” that Dare not Speak its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). 
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tecting individuals from the subordination of dignity in a way that de-
signates them as second-class citizens.199 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas demonstrates 
the double helix approach and provides insight into the troubling 
implications of compelled medical treatment.200  In Lawrence, the Su-
preme Court held that a Texas statute that outlawed same-sex sodomy 
was unconstitutional, overturning its previous decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.201  Justice Kennedy’s opinion cited decisions in which the 
Court recognized the right to privacy in personal relationships, advo-
cating for the right of same-sex couples to the same privacy in inti-
mate relationships:  “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek 
autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”202  
However, the decision did not stop there—it recognized and relied 
upon the interrelated nature of liberty and equality:  “Equality of 
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in impor-
tant respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both inter-
ests.”203  Lawrence held that the Texas statute was unconstitutional, not 
because there was a specific fundamental right to same-sex sodomy, 
but because of the statute’s troubling implications for the rights of 
gay individuals.  The statute essentially criminalized same-sex sexual 
relationships, infringing on the liberty of individuals to choose and 
pursue intimate relationships; in doing so, the statute stigmatized 
these relationships and all gay individuals, designating them as 
second-class citizens.204 
The Court’s analysis in Lawrence allows a more robust approach to 
liberty and equality that addresses many of the troubling implications 
of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women.  First, Lawrence 
 
199 See Siegel, Dignity, supra note 71, at 1703–04 (discussing the Court’s various “dignity” ar-
guments). 
200 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  For a deeper discussion of Tribe’s double helix argument and the 
Lawrence decision, see generally Tribe, supra note 198. 
201 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–79. 
202 Id. at 574. 
203 Id. at 575. 
204 Lawrence notes:   
  When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that decla-
ration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrim-
ination both in the public and in the private spheres. . . . The stigma this crimi-
nal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. . . . [I]t remains a criminal offense 
with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged. 
  Id.; see also Tribe, supra note 198, at 1903–07 (“[T]he social and cultural meaning of any 
ban on sodomy, gender-neutral or otherwise, particularly given Bowers, is that being gay 
or lesbian means being a sodomite, which in turn means being a criminal.”). 
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recognizes that it is not necessary to label a specific act at issue as a 
fundamental right in order to determine that constitutional prin-
ciples are violated by the prohibition of that act where the prohibi-
tion impacts the right of individuals to make private decisions inhe-
rent to their dignity.205  While the right to refuse medical treatment 
has only been given status as a “liberty interest” under the constitu-
tion, compelled treatment significantly impacts the right of women to 
define the borders and contents of deeply personal experiences such 
as medical treatment and childbearing.  It infringes on these rights 
just as the statute at issue in Lawrence infringed on the rights of indi-
viduals to define their personal relationships. 
Second, the Court’s reasoning implies that a statute need not tar-
get a specific class in order to impair that class’s equality.  The 
Court’s reasoning was not grounded in the Texas statute’s applica-
tion to same-sex sodomy alone; because of the strong cultural associa-
tion of sodomy with the gay male, a sodomy statute that applied to all 
individuals would still have furthered the stigmatization of gay indi-
viduals, and would have been “in and of itself . . . an invitation to sub-
ject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in 
the private spheres.”206  Thus, under the Court’s reasoning, even a law 
that applied to all individuals would be unconstitutional.  Compelled 
treatment of pregnant women may not explicitly target women, but 
its targeting of pregnant individuals infringes on the rights of women 
just as surely as sodomy laws infringe on the rights of gay individuals. 
The Lawrence decision exemplifies the way in which infringements 
on liberty and equality can be inextricably intertwined; the Texas sta-
tute infringed on liberty and, in doing so, implicated the equality of 
all gay individuals.  Similarly, compelled medical treatment of preg-
nant women implicates the double helix of liberty and equality.  It 
limits the autonomy of pregnant women and, in doing so, designates 
women as a class of persons with limited liberty and thus second-class 
citizenship.  Indeed, in the context of reproductive rights, Casey 
 
205 See Tribe, supra note 198, at 1900–05 (“[T]he Supreme Court went out of its way to recast 
the plaintiff’s claim [in Lawrence] to substantive protection under the Due Process Clause 
for his private sexual relationships as an asserted ‘fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy.’”). 
206 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also Tribe, supra note 198, at 1907–16 (noting that “cul-
tural conflation of sodomy with ‘homosexual’ sodomy, however out of sync with social re-
ality it may be, means that any law banning sodomy, even if it reaches opposite-sex sodo-
my” will subject homosexual persons to discrimination).  This argument is supported by 
the Court’s reliance on liberty as opposed to merely equal protection and its overturning 
of Bowers, which concerned a statute that criminalized sodomy between all individuals and 
not just same-sex sodomy. 
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hinted at the need for such an approach in order to adequately ad-
dress the right of women to make reproductive decisions: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autono-
my, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . . [T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the 
human condition and so unique to the law.  The mother who carries a 
child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain 
that only she must bear.  That these sacrifices have from the beginning of 
the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her 
in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone 
be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.  Her suffering is 
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its 
own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been 
in the course of our history and our culture.  The destiny of the woman 
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual 
imperatives and her place in society.207 
In Carhart, the Court moved away from this reasoning, all but ig-
noring the dignity of women in its decision.  In doing so, it embraced 
reasoning that may open the door for further curtailment of women’s 
reproductive freedom.  The troubling implications of this move in 
the context of compelled medical treatment demonstrate why a doc-
trinal approach that acknowledges the full impact of state action on 
women’s liberty and equality is vital to uphold their rights as individ-
uals. 
B. Public Health Implications 
Compelled medical treatment and expanded state power over 
women’s reproductive choices also has troubling implications for 
public health.  While the previous section focuses on constitutional 
principles, constitutional concepts of liberty and equality are impor-
tant both because of their impact on doctrine and because constitu-
tional ideas shape culture.208  By limiting women’s liberty and equali-
ty, cases allowing compelled medical treatment not only directly 
impact specific women’s health, but also indirectly impact all wom-
en’s health by shaping the culture of reproductive medicine. 
Expanding state power to compel the medical treatment of preg-
nant women will likely result in cases in which neither maternal nor 
 
207 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1992); see also Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–52). 
208 See Law, supra note 158, at 956–57 (“[C]onstitutional concepts of equality are important 
both because of their concrete impact on legislative power and individual right and be-
cause constitutional ideas reflect and shape culture.”). 
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fetal health is served.  Medicine is inherently imprecise, and medical 
technology and knowledge limits physicians’ abilities to accurately 
predict the outcome of treatment choices.209  For example, Cesarean 
surgeries are often indicated for “fetal distress” as measured by elec-
tronic fetal monitoring (EFM).  However, the efficacy of EFM is ques-
tionable, leading physicians to overestimate risks to the fetus and per-
form unnecessary operations in order to avoid liability.210  While 
ordinarily patients are free to weigh these predictions themselves, 
compelled medical treatment allows the state to weigh the risks for 
the pregnant woman and determine how much risk is appropriate for 
her to undergo in order to further state interests.  Physicians have 
sought—and courts have ordered—compelled medical treatment on-
ly to find that their concerns were unwarranted.211  Expanding state 
justifications for compelled treatment increases the likelihood that 
more women will be compelled to undergo treatment that serves nei-
ther their health nor the health of the child they carry. 
Compelled medical treatment also creates confusing and ethically 
troubling obligations for physicians.  In the shadow of Carhart’s lan-
guage on women’s regret, health care providers may conclude that, 
as a matter of law, pregnant women are less capable of making auto-
nomous medical decisions, particularly where those decisions may 
lead to results women might later regret.  Hospitals and physicians 
may fear that, if the mother is not legally capable of exercising in-
formed consent, they will find themselves liable should she later re-
gret her decision.  The implication that treatment may now be com-
pelled where there is uncertainty about the consequences for the 
mother’s health increases the circumstances in which physicians and 
hospitals may feel the need to seek court intervention to avoid poten-
tial liability.  Where physicians are uncertain about whether a medical 
treatment is necessary for fetal health, they may err on the side of fet-
al health, rather than maternal health, and seek court intervention to 
avoid future liability.212 
Coercive care also damages the doctor-patient relationship and 
discourages women from seeking prenatal care.213  This is particularly 
 
209 See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
210 See Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth:  An Opportunity for Choice that Should be Supported, 32 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 360–62 (2008) (discussing problems with the use of EFM). 
211 See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
212 See Gallagher, supra note 76, at 50–53 (“One of the pressures for court-ordered Caesa-
reans [sic], and probably for the increased number of Caesarean [sic] sections overall, 
arises from physicians’ anxiety about potential malpractice liability.”). 
213 See Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Committee Opinion 321:  Maternal Decision 
Making, Ethics, and the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127, 1134 (2005) (“Coercive 
 
204 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
troubling in the context of women with high risk pregnancies, who 
are most in need of prenatal care but will be more likely to avoid it if 
their high-risk status will encourage physicians to compel treatment.  
For these reasons, medical organizations caution that compelling 
medical treatment of pregnant women raises serious ethical concerns 
for physicians and may damage physicians’ ability to provide prenatal 
care.214 
For those who do seek medical care, the prospect of compelled 
treatment creates an adversarial relationship between patient and 
physician.215  It undermines the trust that allows women to communi-
cate with their physicians.216  If physicians are able to compel treat-
 
and punitive policies are potentially counterproductive in that they are likely to discou-
rage prenatal care and successful treatment, adversely affect infant mortality rates, and 
undermine the physician-patient relationship.”); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at § 
19-2 (“[J]udicial balancing of the interests of pregnant women and their fetuses, and the 
consequent possibility of judicial intervention to require pregnant women to undergo 
medical treatment against their will, adversely affects the doctor-patient relationship and 
may discourage some pregnant women from seeking the health care they need.”); Gal-
lagher, supra note 76, at 53–54 (“Judicial decisions authorizing forced Caesareans [sic] 
threaten to distort the medical care of all birthing women . . . [and] introduce an implicit 
threat of coercion into doctor-patient relationships.”). 
214 The American Medical Association (AMA), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), 
the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (ACOG), and the American Public 
Health Association (APHA) all discourage physicians from seeking court intervention 
and state that pregnant women’s medical treatment decisions should be respected.  See 
FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, § 19-2 (discussing arguments for and against judicial inter-
vention to protect the interests of the fetus); H.M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Preg-
nancy:  Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by 
Pregnant Women, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2663, 2663-66 (1990) (“The physician’s duty is to 
ensure that the pregnant woman makes an informed and thoughtful decision, not to in-
dicate the woman’s decision.  Physicians [s]hould [n]ot [h]ave a [l]egal [d]uty to [s]eek 
[c]ourt-[o]rdered [o]bstetrical [i]nterventions.”); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pe-
diatrics, supra note 213, at 1061 (stating that maternal decisions must be respected, criti-
cizing coercive and punitive measures, and stating that judicial intervention should not 
be employed absent “extraordinary circumstances, circumstances that, in fact, the Com-
mittee on Ethics cannot currently imagine”); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pedia-
trics, Fetal Therapy—Ethical Considerations, 103 PEDIATRICS 1061, 1061–62 (1999) (stating 
that physicians should respect maternal choice and assessment of risk and that, under li-
mited circumstances when fetal therapy would prevent irrevocable and substantial fetal 
harm with negligible risk to the health and well-being of the pregnant woman, physicians 
should engage in a process of communication and conflict resolution that may require 
consultation with an ethics committee; judicial review is only to be employed in “rare cas-
es”); see also Harris, supra note 72, at 140–42 (outlining the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists position on maternal versus fetal rights). 
215 See MERRICK, supra note 100, at 73 (“Court-ordered intervention may . . . create adversari-
al relations between the woman and the fetus—and subsequently the born child—if [the 
woman] feels her own health are welfare are being sacrificed.”). 
216 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 76, at § 19-2 (“[J]udicial intervention to require pregnant 
women to undergo medical treatment against their will . . . may discourage some preg-
nant women from seeking the health care they need.”); Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra 
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ment of pregnant women at the expense of their health, pregnant 
women may be less likely to discuss symptoms of conditions they fear 
will result in a court order.  Physicians, in turn, may be less likely to 
explain medical options and obtain informed consent if they can 
threaten with court orders those patients they believe to be irrational 
or unlikely to agree with their recommended treatment.217  These 
consequences have particularly troubling implications for low-income 
and minority patients.  Low-income women have more difficulty find-
ing a physician, much less the flexibility to choose a physician that 
will respect their decisions and birthing plans.218  A 1987 New England 
Journal of Medicine survey of compelled medical treatment of pregnant 
women found that 81% of women subject to orders were minorities, 
and 24% did not speak English as their primary language.219 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Carhart decision gives new life to an outdated view of preg-
nant women as second-class citizens.  Like Judge Branford’s opinion 
in In re A.C., the Carhart majority designates pregnant women as a 
unique category of persons with limited autonomy.  It implies that 
women not only have diminished rights to exercise informed con-
sent, but also that, in the context of medical decisions that could de-
trimentally impact the child they carry, pregnant women have dimi-
nished capacity to exercise informed consent.  The decision 
concludes that the state, armed with the dubious interests of express-
ing respect for fetal life and protecting women from making medical 
decisions they might regret, may ban a procedure that may be a 
woman’s safest option where questionable evidence creates any de-
gree of uncertainty about women’s medical needs. 
 
note 101, at 45 (arguing that forced Cesarean sections “encourage[] an adversarial rela-
tionship between the obstetrician and the patient”); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics, supra note 213, at 1134 (“Various studies have suggested that attempts to cri-
minalize pregnant women’s behavior discourage women from seeking prenatal care.”). 
217 See Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 101, at 45 (“[The ability to seek court-ordered op-
erations] gives the obstetrician a weapon to bully women he views as irrational into sub-
mission.”); Gallagher, supra note 76, at 52 (“Courts should make clear that doctors and 
hospitals will not be under a duty to disregard a competent woman’s rights by overriding 
her informed refusal of a Caesarean [sic] section or other invasive medical treatment.”). 
218 See Barbara M. Aved et al., Barriers to Prenatal Care for Low-Income Women, 158 WEST. J. MED. 
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While this Article focuses on the majority opinion’s implications 
for compelled medical treatment, the majority opinion’s expansion 
of state interest and erosion of the primacy of women’s health has 
implications far beyond compelled treatment and abortion.  During 
the course of pregnancy, nearly every action a woman takes is likely to 
have some impact on the fetus because of the fetus’s dependence on 
the pregnant woman’s body.  Few of these decisions will create a risk 
of fetal death such that the state’s interest in fetal life recognized in 
Roe is implicated.  However, Carhart expands the state interest in fetal 
life and reinterprets the state interest in maternal health to implicate 
nearly any decision a pregnant woman may make.  Pregnant women 
may also wish to undertake medical treatment that poses additional 
risks to the fetus, such as elective surgery or medications for pain 
management or psychological illness.  Under Carhart, the state may 
justify intervention in these decisions based on newly recognized in-
terest in promoting respect for human life and preventing pregnant 
women from making medical decisions they may regret due to their 
unique relationship with the child they carry.  State intervention need 
not be limited to medical treatment.  These newly recognized state 
interests are also potentially implicated when an obese pregnant 
woman eats fattening foods, when a woman with a misaligned placen-
ta engages in sexual intercourse, or when a pregnant woman decides 
to forgo prenatal vitamins.  Pregnancy is unique in many ways, both 
as a medical condition and as a life experience.  The exceptional ex-
perience of women, however, does not justify their designation as a 
separate class of individuals deprived of basic rights to bodily auton-
omy and informed consent.  Rather than commandeering the bodies 
of pregnant women, the most effective way to ensure healthy preg-
nancies and births is to ensure that every medical decision a pregnant 
woman makes is fully informed, uncoerced, and supported by her 
ability to access quality medical care and effect her choice in the saf-
est way possible. 
 
 
 
